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ABSTRACT
THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD IN THE DEVELOPED WESTERN WORLD:
A FOCUS ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND ON
THE ROLE OF FAMILY BACKGROUND
Maria Sironi
Frank F. Furstenberg

The second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by substantial changes in
demographic behaviors. Among these transformations also the process by which
adolescents and teenagers transition to adulthood has changed greatly in many countries
of the Western world. All the events of the transition to adulthood have been delayed and
life course trajectories became more diverse. There are some aspects concerning the
mentioned changes that have not been extensively studied in the literature. This
dissertation is a collection of three papers that have the aim to investigate these neglected
aspects concerning life course trajectories of young adults. In particular, the first two
papers look at trends over time in the achievement of economic independence, a crucial
event in the transition to adulthood that has not received enough attention so far. The first
paper is a cross-national comparison describing the situation in six different developed
societies. The second paper studies only the United States, going back to the 1970s and
tracing changes over time until 2007. The third paper, instead, focuses on the role of
parental social class in the transition to adulthood. The exact mechanisms by which
socio-economic status affects the transition to economic self-sufficiency and family
formation are largely unknown. A better understanding of these issues can highlight
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additional information to understand why and how the transition to adulthood has
changed in the last five decades.
Analyses were carried out using survey data from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS),
the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS, NLSY79, NLSY97), and the Multipurpose
ISTAT (FSS 2003). A first main finding of this study is that the transition to economic
independence has been delayed together with all the other events of the transition to
adulthood. This process has occurred in all developed Western countries even if with
some differences. A second finding is that parental social class can explain some of the
variation in life courses, and that a higher social class is associated with a postponement
in the transition. Also the role of family background, however, differentiates based on
welfare state regimes, institutions, and the strength of family ties.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The Transition to Adulthood in the Developed Western World: Trends
and Changes
The second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by substantial changes in
demographic behaviors. Developed countries have witnessed large decreases in fertility
(Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003), with a very recent reversal of the decline (Myrskyla,
Kohler and Billari 2009), a strong reduction in marriage rates or at least a postponement
of family formation (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002), and an increase in the prevalence
of cohabitation and divorces. Among these important transformations, also the process by
which adolescents and teenagers transition to adulthood has changed greatly in many – if
not all – countries in the Western developed world. Typically, the demographic events of
adult transitions have included such markers as leaving home, finishing education,
securing a job, marrying or cohabiting, and having children. In the postwar years, all the
events in the transition occurred quickly (usually by age 25 for both men and women)
and in an orderly sequence beginning with school completion, full-time work, and homeleaving. Since then, the transition has lengthened and become more circuitous.
All the events of the transition to adulthood have been delayed (Aassve et al.
2002a; Aassve et al. 2002b; Avery, Goldscheider and Speare 1992; Ermisch and Di Salvo
1997; Furstenberg 2010; Johnson and DaVanzo 1998; Settersten, Furstenberg and
Rumbaut 2006), and it is important to take into account their interdependence and strong
interactions: there has been a substantial expansion of education, especially among
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women, leading to an increase in the age at school completion. This increase may be
correlated to a later entrance in the labor market and a delay in leaving the parental home
– at least in some contexts (e.g. Southern Europe). A postponement in the achievement of
independence (monetary and non-monetary) from the family of origin can be to some
extent associated to or be responsible for a later age at family formation, i.e. cohabitation,
marriage and parenthood (Billari, Philipov and Baizán 2001; De Jong-Gierveld, Liefbroer
and Beekink 1991; Mulder and Wagner 1993).
Moreover, individuals had to adapt their life course trajectories because of
profound structural and cultural changes (such as the globalization process and a decline
in the normative imperative to marry) occurred in developed societies in the last decades.
As a consequence, these trajectories have become more diverse. The “second
demographic transition” theory would use the term individualization to characterize
changes in the life course (Lesthaeghe 1995; Van de Kaa 1987), which includes many
different aspects, such as the de-institutionalization, the de-standardization, and the
differentiation in the life trajectories of young adults (Elzinga and Liefbroer 2007)
(Bruckner and Mayer 2005). The order and the timing of events may vary considerably
between individuals, as well as the duration in different states.
There is much public debate about why the transition to adulthood changed so
suddenly, and social scientists have not yet reached consensus on this question. An
increase in the years of schooling may cause a delayed entry in the labor market; over
time the structure of the labor market itself could have changed so that well-paid jobs
require more education and are therefore more difficult for young adults to find (Collins
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1971; Danziger and Ratner 2010; Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Katz and Autor
1999). Increases in earnings inequality, employment instability, and shortening of job
tenure due to higher turnover are some of the most relevant changes that have occurred
since the 1970s. Together with these structural changes, youths’ expectations about what
it takes to live independently have risen, along with the actual costs of living. Moreover
the normative and cultural shifts that have taken place in the second half of the 20th
century may also contribute to an increase in the heterogeneity characterizing individual
life courses (Arnett 2000a; Arnett 2000b; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe
1995; Van de Kaa 1987; Van de Kaa 2001).
There are some aspects concerning the mentioned changes in the transition to
adulthood that have not been extensively studied in the literature. In particular, the
achievement of economic independence by young adults is a crucial event in the
transition that has not received enough attention so far. As a matter of fact being
employed full-time and achieving financial self-sufficiency, in particular, are still
fundamental steps in the transition. Without these steps it is very difficult to assume other
roles that are associated with adulthood. Moreover, timing and sequencing of events in
the patterns of transition to adulthood are still strongly influenced by family background
(Elzinga and Liefbroer 2007; Ravanera, Rajulton and Burch 2006). The role of parental
social class and the exact mechanisms by which socio-economic status affects the
transition to adulthood and the ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency are largely
unknown. This dissertation is a collection of three papers that have the aim to shed some
light on these aspects on life course trajectories of young adults that have only partially
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been investigated in the literature. A better understanding of these issues can highlight
additional information to understand why and how the transition to adulthood has
changed in the last five decades.
Readers should note that the three chapters of this dissertation (Sections 2 to 4)
are written in the form of journal articles, thus intended to be read individually. This
makes a certain degree of overlap between them, as well as between the Introduction and
the rest of the dissertation, unavoidable. Furthermore, in this Introduction I have focused
on what unites the empirical chapters. However, each chapter also covers aspects that are
not discussed (extensively) in this Introduction, but which make each of the articles more
complete.

1.2 Research Aim
The general aim of this dissertation is to describe the change in the transition to
adulthood occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, in particular focusing on
the transition of young adults to economic independence and on the role of family
background in shaping life courses. This study allows to expand existing social science
literature by investigating crucial topics that have not received adequate attention so far.
A goal is to explore the first steps in the transition to adulthood, mainly the entry
into the labor market, the attainment of financial self-sufficiency through labor earnings,
and the departure from parental home. This involves a first descriptive analysis of the
timing and quantum of these events in the developed societies, and how they changed
over time. The approach includes a cross-national comparison of six developed countries
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in two points in time, so to have a general picture of trends in different contexts (Chapter
1). This first study takes also into account how the events are interrelated, and in
particular how the economic conditions of young adults are associate with their living
arrangements.
Secondly, a more detailed analysis on the United States is performed, investigating the
trends in the achievement of economic self-sufficiency over time from 1970s to 2007
(Chapter 2). In this second part the aim is also to study whether there has been a
convergence between men and women in employment and financial independence over
time and how changes in the transition to adulthood differ by social class and family
background.
A second goal, given the importance of family background found in the study of
economic independence, is to consider how parental social class influences the entire life
course of young adults (Chapter 3). Parents’ socioeconomic status can influence the
sequence of events characterizing the transition to adulthood in terms of socioeconomic
inequalities through a different availability of opportunities for social mobility. Several
studies show that in North America, a higher familial status tends to decrease the
complexity of trajectories or, in other words, to push towards a more “traditional” pattern,
i.e. a trajectory in which the end of education and the first job precede union formation,
which in turn precedes parenthood. On the other hand, it has been highlighted that in
Europe the familial status has a different effect with an increasing complexity in life
course as the social class increases. Hence, the aim is to examine in details the sequence
of transitions highlighting, in a comparative perspective, how the life trajectories are
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influenced by parental social class in the US and Italy.
The specific aim is to answer the following research questions:
How has the transition to adulthood changed in the last decades, in particular the first
steps, i.e. entry into the labor market and the achievement of economic independence?
Are these changes different across developed countries?
How do the trends differ between young men and women? Has there been convergence
between men and women in employment and financial independence over time?
How do changes in the transition to adulthood differ by social class and family
background? Is the role of parents’ socioeconomic status changing over time and context
specific?

1.3 The Transition to Economic Independence
This section provides an overview of the first two chapters that will follow in this
dissertation. They are closely related, because they cover similar research questions, but
different contexts. In particular, the first chapter produces a descriptive analysis of trends
over time concerning the first steps of the transition to adulthood: working full-time,
achieving financial self-sufficiency, and leaving the parental home. Our approach
involves a cross-national comparison of six countries (the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands) in two points in time (the mid
1980s and 2004). The second chapter focuses only on the United States and presents a
detailed investigation of the trends in the achievement of economic self-sufficiency over
time, and some of the possible determinants of the observed delay. It compares the life
course of young adults between ages 22 and 30 in 1973, 1987 and in 2007.
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Chapter 1: The Transition to Independence of Young adults in the Western World: a
Comparative Analysis.
In a scenario of postponement of the events leading to adulthood, being employed fulltime, and the achievement of financial independence in particular, are still fundamental
steps in the transition. Without these steps it is very difficult to assume other roles that
are associated with adulthood. However also the timing of leaving the parental home and
achieving economic self-sufficiency has been delayed. The primary reason of a prolonged
passage from school to full-time employment and, consequently, financial selfsufficiency, is that now it takes much longer to get a job that pays enough to support a
one-person household or a family than 30 years ago (Berlin, Furstenberg and Waters
2010a). In addition many factors can contribute to the delay, such as the expansion of
education, the significant reformation of labor market structures to face the global
competitive pressure, cultural and normative shifts.
The changes in the transition to adulthood, however, differ in different parts of the
world. If we consider Western developed countries, the delay observed in Europe is more
sizable than in the United States, and also within Europe there is great variation in the
timing and sequencing of the events considered as part of the transition. Southern
European countries – such as Spain, Italy, and Greece – show a greater postponement
than Scandinavian countries (Aassve et al. 2002a; Billari, Philipov and Baizán 2001;
Iacovou 2002). The international differences may derive from the variation in
institutional forms and cultural contexts that generates diverse behavioral adaptation and
timing of events (Vogel 2002). Other than cultural explanations, other factors might be
contributing to divergence among countries: labor market structures, which are
7
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responsible for the creation of jobs, turnover, and earnings standards; welfare regimes
play an important role in providing support to young adults through transfers and family
policies; finally, family ties and the amount of family support that individuals receive
during the transition to adulthood. Some studies can be found in the literature dealing
with changes over time in the transition to adulthood using a cross-national perspective
(Billari and Wilson 2001), but only a few are focused on the steps that lead young adults
to independence from the family of origin, such as full-time employment, financial
independence and leaving the parental home (Bell et al. 2007; Smeeding and Phillips
2002).
The aim of this study is to produce an exploratory, descriptive analysis of trends
over time concerning the first steps of the transition to adulthood: working full-time,
earnings level, and leaving the parental home. The approach involves a cross-national
comparison of six countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
Norway, and the Netherlands. In particular I compare young adults between ages 22 and
30 from these countries in two points in time – the mid 1980s and 2004 – using data of
the Luxemburg Income Study in order to detect common and divergent trends. The first
step of our investigation is to present some descriptive graphs showing the employment
status of the individuals in the selected samples. Graphs are produced distinguishing
between men and women, and between the mid-1980s and the 2004 samples. Secondly, I
look at the proportion of surveyed young adults who are not classified as low-paid
workers, considering their wages and labor earnings. To establish if a person is a lowpaid worker or not I use the OECD definition, i.e. if the wage is lower than two thirds of
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median earnings. The probability of being employed, and even more the level of wages
are positively correlated to the level of education. This is especially true in contexts
where in the last forty years education expanded and returns to education (mainly
college) increased. For this reason I also examine the trends of the proportion of low-paid
workers dividing people in the sample by level of education. Finally, it is important to
understand how the level of wages is related to the probability of living with parents.
Being self-sufficient is not a necessary condition to leave the parental home (for example,
college students), but it is surely one of the most important steps that can induce young
adults to establish his/her own independent household.

Chapter 2: Trends in the Economic Independence of Young Adults in the United States:
1973-2007. Coauthored with Professor Frank F. Furstenberg (University of
Pennsylvania).
Chapter 1 offers a broad and descriptive comparative perspective of the trends in the
achievement of economic independence among young adults in developed societies.
Chapter 2, instead, focuses only on the United States and presents a more detailed
analysis in the first steps of the transition to adulthood, looking at employment and
economic conditions of young people since 1970s.
Beginning in the 1970s and lasting until the late 1980s, the US economy
experienced periods of great instability. Some analysts date the end of rapid growth in
real earnings and the beginning of slower growth in 1973 after the oil embargo that
resulted in a deep recession. At the same time there was an acceleration in the growth of
earnings inequality, especially among men (Levy and Murnane 1992). For both men and
women, increased inequality in earnings was driven by increased wage variation rather
9
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than increased variation in hours worked. Despite the sustained growth in employment in
the United States until the recession of 2007–08, there is longstanding concern that the
quality of the stock of well-paying jobs in the economy is deteriorating. Stable jobs with
high wages have been replaced by service-sector jobs that report high rates of turnover,
low wages, and frequent part-time employment. Employers who need flexibility to face
greater uncertainty regarding product demand have come to rely increasingly on
temporary workers, subcontractors, and part-time workers (Farber 2007).
This chapter compares the life course of young adults, using data from the
National Longitudinal Surveys in 1966 (NLS Original Cohorts), the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 1979 (NLSY79) and 1997 (NLSY97). While substantial
differences exist between the data sets, they all collect essential demographic and
socioeconomic information, i.e. respondents’ educational attainment, employment and
earnings, partnership status, living arrangements, and some family background, such as
parents’ education level. These three data sets enable us to compare individuals making
the transition to adulthood in 1973, 1987, and 2007, respectively. Following this strategy
I obtain three samples with an almost identical age range (22–30 in the NLS and
NLSY79, and 22–28 in NLSY97) but in three distinct historical contexts. Our aim is to
examine three questions related to the changing barriers to gaining financial
independence: 1) How has timing of the entry into the labor market and of the
achievement of financial independence changed since the 1970s? 2) How do the trends
differ between young men and women? 3) How do changes in the transition to adulthood
differ by social class and family background?
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To answer the first research question posed above, I start by describing the
employment situation of the young adults in the three samples. I next compute the
percentage of young adults who are able to live independently and support themselves
with their own earnings. To define the affordability of living independently, the poverty
thresholds established by the US Census Bureau is used and I consider economic selfsufficiency to include individuals who report an income greater than 200 percent of the
poverty threshold. Also, the examination takes into account of the importance of social
class variations over time by computing the proportion economically independent and/or
able to support a family by parents’ education level. Finally, I implement an event history
analysis – through some complementary logistic regression models with random effects
for individuals (Lancaster 1979; Nickell 1979) – to explore the possibility of a
convergence in life-course trajectories among men and women, and to investigate the
association between parents’ socioeconomic status and the timing of economic selfsufficiency.

1.4 The Role of Family Background and Social Class
This section provides an overview of the third and last chapter of this dissertation, whose
aim is to examine in details the sequence of transitions to adulthood highlighting, in a
comparative perspective, how the life trajectories are influenced by parental social class
and gender in the US and Italy.
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Chapter 3: The Role of Parental Social Class in the Transition to Adulthood: a Sequence
Analysis Approach in Italy and the United States. Coauthored with Nicola Barban
(University of Groningen) and Roberto Impicciatore (Università di Milano).
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 revealed a general trend towards postponement of crucial events
in the transition to adulthood, and towards the individualization of life course trajectories.
Within the framework of postponement and individualization of trajectories, timing and
sequencing of events are still strongly influenced by family background (Elzinga and
Liefbroer 2007; Ravanera, Rajulton and Burch 2006). The relevance of family social
class on the subsequent life course starts before birth, it continues throughout
adolescence, and it is able to shape the course of young adult transitions and
psychological development in the third and fourth decades of life.
Youth from affluent and well-educated families marry and have children later in life
because of a longer education, much more extended search for a permanent partner in
life, and a lower incidence of unintended pregnancy (Furstenberg 2008). In other words,
the family background is crucial in determining the individual resources that may lead to
good decisions in the early phases of adulthood. The role of parental social class in life
course trajectories of young adults is the main focus of this third chapter.
Moreover, I compare two different countries – the United States and Italy – in
order to understand if and how the institutional structure and context can fill the gap
stemming from disadvantaged family background. Indeed, U.S. and Italy are located in
different stages along the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa
1986) showing a different incidence of “individualized” and “secularized” behaviours
such as informal cohabitations, non-marital fertility and marital dissolution. Finally, the
12
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role of parental background may be different across gender in specific contexts. The aim
of the analysis is then threefold. First, I will evaluate the impact of social origins on the
patterns of transition to adulthood as a whole; second, I apply a cross-national
comparative perspective to evaluate the role of a specific context in the relationship
between parental social class and the transition to adulthood; third I focus on gender
differences and in particular to evaluate if the role of parental background is genderspecific in the two counties.
In order to answer the research questions I use two different data sets, one for
each country, containing similar information on the life course of young adults. For the
United States data collected through the NLSY79 are used. The sample includes 8,636
individuals born between 1957 and 1964, and they are followed from ages 14-22 to ages
31-39. For Italy instead the 2003 Multipurpose ISTAT survey called “Famiglia e soggetti
sociali” is used. I select the same birth cohorts included in the NLSY79 to make the
samples more homogeneous and comparable. Our final sample for Italy includes 6,002
individuals. The longitudinal structure of the NLSY79 and the retrospective questions in
the Multipurpose ISTAT survey enable us to reconstruct the steps, year by year, in the
independence and family transitions for each individual in the sample.
The method used to investigate the relationship between the social class and the
life course trajectories is based on the sequence analysis (Abbott 1995; Abbott and Tsay
2000; Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010). I adopt a life course perspective, looking at the entire
development of school, employment, and family history, taking into account the fact that
the process is iterative and cumulative, so it is important to take a unitary, holistic
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approach and look at the effect of family background on the whole life course rather than
on single events of the transition to adulthood (Barban 2011; Barban and Billari 2012;
Billari 2005). The events taken into account are the following: end of education, entry
into labor force, leaving the parental home, first union (marriage and/or cohabitation),
and parenthood. Parents’ social status is defined on the basis of education level when the
respondent was 14 years old. Trajectories are described along three dimensions: the
median age at each event (timing), the proportion of individuals who experienced each
event by age 35 (quantum), and finally the frequencies of the five most common
independence and family trajectories showing the sequence of events (sequencing). All
these dimensions are explored by gender and parental social class.
After defining the different sequences and describing them in terms of timing,
quantum, and sequencing, a sequence analysis is implemented to identify specific
typologies of life trajectories – dealing simultaneously with timing, quantum, and
sequencing – in order to study how social class is related to the likelihood of ending up in
a certain typology. Finally, a multinomial logistic regression analysis is performed to
investigate the relationship between parents’ socio-economic status and the probability of
being part of a specific typology (determined through the cluster analysis) in a specific
country.
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2. Chapter 1: “Independence of Young Adults in the Western World: a
Comparative Analysis Across Countries and Over Time”.
2.1 Introduction
!
Over the last fifty years the process that brings adolescents and teenagers to adulthood
has changed greatly, in many – if not all – countries in the West developed world. After
World War II adult roles, such as being employed full-time, getting married and having
children were achieved by the early 20s. Nowadays it takes much longer to assume such
roles, and the whole transition has been postponed to the late 20s, early 30s (Aassve et al.
2002a; Furstenberg 2010; Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006; Sironi and
Furstenberg 2012).
Not only has a general postponement process characterized changes in the
transition to adulthood, but also an increase in the diversity of the trajectories has
occurred. The sequence of events leading to adulthood that were somehow standard in the
1950s and 1960s – exit school, entry in full-time employment, leaving parental home,
marriage and parenthood – is not so common anymore. The order of events has become
less straightforward and it is more likely to experience multiple events at different points
in time (Elzinga and Liefbroer 2007; Marini 1984a; Marini 1984b).
Given these substantial changes in demographic behaviors related to the transition
from adolescence to adulthood, employment, economic, and living conditions of young
adults in their 20s might be considerably different now compared to three decades ago.
Some of these variations have been documented in the literature, in particular those
related to school-to-work transition and expansion of education (Blanchflower and
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Freeman 2000b; Gangl 2002; Quintini, Martin and Martin 2007), and those concerning
the departure of young adults from the parental home (Mandic 2008; Mulder and Clark
2000; Mulder, Clark and Wagner 2002). However there are very few studies focusing on
how economic conditions and financial self-sufficiency of youth have changed over time,
looking at individual earnings from the labor market. This aspect is closely related to
school-to-work transition and to the decision to leave the parental home. Moreover, given
increasing returns to education, changes in time may be different for those with higher
educational attainment. This work has the scope to fill the mentioned gap in the literature.
In addition, the adopted approach involves a cross-national comparison to take
into account the fact that changes in the transition to adulthood and demographic
behaviors differ in different parts of the world (Billari 2004; Billari and Liefbroer 2010;
Liefbroer and Goldscheider 2006). If we consider Western developed countries, the delay
observed in Europe is more sizable than in the United States (Aassve et al. 2002b), and
also within Europe there is great variation in the timing and sequencing of the events
considered as part of the transition. Southern European countries for example – such as
Spain, Italy, and Greece – show a greater postponement than Scandinavian countries
(Aassve et al. 2002a; Billari, Philipov and Baizán 2001; Iacovou 2002). The international
differences may derive from the variation in institutional forms and cultural contexts that
generates diverse behavioral adaptation and timing of events (Vogel 2002). Other than
cultural explanations, other factors might be contributing to divergence among countries:
labor market structures, which are responsible for the creation of jobs, turnover, and
earnings standards; welfare regimes play an important role in providing support to young
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adults through transfers and family policies; finally, family ties and the amount of family
support that individuals receive during the transition to adulthood (Esping-Andersen
1990; Ferrera 1996; Mayer 2001; Micheli 2004; Mills et al. 2008; Reher 2005; Trifiletti
1999).
The aim of this paper, then, is to produce an exploratory, descriptive analysis of
trends over time concerning the first steps of the transition to adulthood: working status,
earnings level, and leaving the parental home. The analysis involves a cross-national
comparison of six countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
Norway, and the Netherlands. In particular these countries have very different welfare
regimes, culture, demographic behaviors and labor market structures, and represent a
natural sample of diverse experiences to detect common and divergent trends. These
countries are compared in two points in time – the mid 1980s and 2004 – using the
Luxemburg Income Study in order to take into account not only the differences across
countries, but also over time. This analysis can give insights on some possible
explanations triggering the changes in the transition to adulthood that have characterized
developed societies in the last three decades.

2.2 Background
It is useful to start clarifying that not only the transition to adulthood has changed over
time, it has been delayed, and the sequence of events is not as orderly and predictable as
it was in the recent past, but also the sense of this process – as individuals experience it –
has been greatly altered. In other words, the notion of becoming an adult has probably
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changed as the process has become less orderly and more prolonged (Billari and
Liefbroer 2010; Furstenberg et al. 2003; Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006). A
special module of the 2002 General Social Survey, trying to assess whether Americans
have shifted their expectations about when adulthood could be accomplished, found that
“95% of them consider education, employment, financial independence, and the ability to
support a family to be important milestones on the path to adulthood”. On the contrary,
only half believe that marriage and parenthood are necessary steps to become an adult
(Furstenberg et al. 2003). If in the past the word adulthood was more associated to family
formation, today it is more related to self-actualization in the education and working
career, and consequently to financial self-sufficiency. It is important, then, to focus on the
first steps in the transition to adulthood: the school-to-work transition and the ability to
face living expenses with earnings are becoming crucial markers of the process (Berlin,
Furstenberg and Waters 2010a).

Previous Findings
Events like the completion of education and the entry into the labor market, or the
departure from the parental home have been extensively studied in the recent literature
(Aassve et al. 2002a; Blanchflower and Freeman 2000b; Gangl 2002; Mandic 2008;
Mulder and Clark 2000; Mulder, Clark and Wagner 2002; Quintini, Martin and Martin
2007). These markers of the transition have been investigated in several countries and
also their changes over time have been taken into consideration.
First of all, the expansion of education has pushed up the median age of
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completing schooling across developed societies in recent decades. Cohorts born in the
1950s in Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, for example, had a median age of exiting
education around age 16, but it increased for cohorts born in the 1970s to age 17 in Great
Britain and Germany and to almost age 20 in Italy (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011;
Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2004). The proportion of people completing upper secondary
and tertiary education are high in the United States among people born in the late 1960s
and 1970s – 90% and 40% respectively (OECD 2005). The same figures are even higher
in Scandinavian countries, where the completion rate of tertiary education approaches
50% in 2007. The lowest rates are observed in Germany, and Southern European
countries (OECD 2009).
The expansion of education has for sure implications on the age at which young
adults start working, causing a delay of the entrance into the labor market (Corijn and
Klijzing 2001; Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2004). On top of that, the structure of the labor
market itself has been reformed significantly to face the global competitive pressure.
Increase in earnings inequality, in employment instability, and shortening of job tenure
due to higher turnover are some of the most relevant changes that occurred since 1970s
(Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Katz and Autor 1999; Sironi and Furstenberg
2012). If among people born in the 1950s the median age at first job was between age 16
and age 19, among 1970s birth cohorts the median age range was between 19 and 24 in
developed western countries (Schizzerotto and Lucchini 2004). Instability of labor
markets and greater difficulties in finding a job have been a major cause in the
postponement of labor market entry, even with some differences across countries
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(Bernardi, Gangl and van de Werfhorst 2004; Blanchflower and Freeman 2000a; Breen
2005; Brzinsky-Fay 2007; Brzinsky-Fay 2008; Gangl 2002; Ryan 2001; Scherer 2005).
Young adults in Southern Europe often experience a period of career instability when
they exit education, and youth unemployment is highest in those countries (Brzinsky-Fay
2007; Quintini, Martin and Martin 2007). The entry into the labor market is easier and
faster in continental countries, while liberal and Scandinavian ones occupy an
intermediate position (Gangl 2002; Quintini, Martin and Martin 2007; Scherer 2001). In
fact, here young people may experience high unemployment and uncertainty immediately
after school completion, but only for a short time.
Another event that has been extensively studied is the departure from the parental
home, that marks the beginning of the social independence (if not financial). The age at
leaving the parental home has increased over time, but the postponement has been only
modest in most countries except for Southern Europe, where the median age has gone up
substantially (Billari and Wilson 2001). In Northern Europe young adults leave their
family of origin very early, before age 20. In continental and liberal countries the event
happens in the early 20s, while in countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece it takes
place in the late 20s or early 30s (Aassve et al. 2002a; Billari 2004; Cherlin, Scabini and
Rossi 1997; Mandic 2008).
Multiple studies, as seen above, can be found in the literature dealing with
changes over time in the first steps of the transition to adulthood using a cross-national
perspective, but only a few are focused on one of the main steps that lead young adults to
independence from the family of origin, i.e. financial self-sufficiency. Smeeding and
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Phillips (2002) analyzed the economic sufficiency of young people’s earnings in the
1990s in seven countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the Netherlands) using the Luxemburg Income Study. They found that
in all countries, only a minority of young people is able to support themselves in their late
teens and early twenties with their earnings alone. Even when social transfers are taken
into account, a significant proportion of young people remain unable to support
themselves, much less a family, before their mid- to late twenties. Although incomes
increase markedly through the early twenties, poverty rates decline much more slowly in
this age group, indicating that young people with low earnings are protected from poverty
to a degree because of living with their families of origin. In their paper they just look at
one point in time, detecting the age change, but not the change over time in the timing of
events. Bell et al. (2007), on the other end, compare trends in six countries (United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Italy, and Germany) in the household living
arrangements, employment rates, and earnings levels as young adults rise in age from 18
to 34 years old, in the mid-1980s and late 1990s. According to their analysis the
economic self-sufficiency declined over time among young adults. Only women in their
late 20s and early 30s somewhat improved their prospects, even though their levels stay
below those observed among men. The U.S. and to some extent the U.K. represent partial
exceptions to this general pattern: “Between the mid-1980s and 2000 employment rates
improved among young Americans in their late 20s and early 30s, and earnings levels
either remained stable or increased modestly” (Bell et al. 2007).
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Convergence/Divergence over time across Countries: the Role of Welfare States and
Family Ties
Based on the literature summarized above, there is little evidence to show a clear
convergence in life course patterns in different countries (Billari and Wilson 2001;
Liefbroer and Goldscheider 2006). The main trend that is confirmed by all empirical
studies on this topic is that of “converging divergences” (Blossfeld et al. 2012; Mills et
al. 2008), meaning that all countries show a de-standardization in demographic behavior
and increasing diversity at the individual level (Buchmann 1989; Kohli 2007; Shanahan
2000). It has been argued that the lack of convergence may be due to differences in part
in the labor market regulations, in part in welfare regimes (and so in the diversity
underlying institutional structures), and in part in cultural aspects like family ties. Both
institutions and culture influence life course trajectories creating prospects and
constraints to which people adapt (Breen and Buchmann 2002).
Different types of welfare regimes have been identified (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Mayer 2001), potentially influencing individuals’ behavior, especially on their
“demographic” decisions. The four regimes include the social-democratic welfare state
(Scandinavian countries), characterized by high levels of state support and a focus on the
individuals. These benefits tend to weaken the individual’s reliance on the family as a
locus of support and encourage autonomous behavior. The conservative welfare state
provides generous support for the family rather than the individual (e.g. France, Germany
and Netherlands), and so reinforces family ties; the liberal welfare regime, shows a
modest level of provisions based on means-tested benefits – applicable only in case of
inefficient markets – and oriented to individuals (e.g. UK and US). Another category of
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welfare regime has been proposed to include the Southern European countries (e.g. Italy
and Spain), where we observe a strong reliance on the family as the locus of support and
low levels of welfare provisions from the state (Ferrera 1996; Mayer 2001; Trifiletti
1999).
According to this classification, each welfare state regime is associated to a
different behavior in the transition to adulthood. In Social Democratic countries, for
example, labor market entry and leaving parental home should take place at relatively
younger ages owing to generous social benefits, enabling young individuals to have more
certainty about their future economic conditions and hence to have greater latitude in
forming independent households. In conservative and liberal countries, where benefits are
targeted and specific to certain groups of people or very marginal, it is difficult to predict
a typical life course trajectory, but would expect a lower de-standardization and
differentiation of life courses than in Scandinavian countries. In contrast, Southern
European countries should show late exit from parental home, late marriage and
childbearing, given the lower level of benefits and so the stronger dependence on the
family of origin (Aassve, Iacovou and Mencarini 2006; Aassve et al. 2002a; Aassve and
Lappegård 2009; Billari 2004; Billari, Philipov and Baizán 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990;
Mills et al. 2008; Mulder, Clark and Wagner 2002). The process of economic
globalization that is affecting developed societies in the last decades is generating a
unique level of uncertainty, and welfare regimes can facilitate or obstruct the transition to
adulthood (Blossfeld et al. 2005), and in particular the transition to economic
independence through the achievement of full-time employment.
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The role of welfare state provisions is even more important when the labor market
is not working efficiently. If the opportunity structure in the labor market is unstable, and
creates uncertainty in future employment and earnings, young individuals facing the
transition to adulthood try to adapt their behavior in order to improve their immediate and
future living conditions. Consequently, the timing of the events in their life trajectories
reflects the combination of the opportunities based on labor market functioning, welfare
state provisions and family support (Vogel 2002). As far as family support is concerned,
and cultural and institutional differences more generally, we need to pinpoint that it may
be inappropriate to take welfare regimes as purely exogenous in the long run. For
instance, whether a society encourages young adults to attend higher education at
universities with on-campus accommodation, as opposed to having local universities
where young adults and their parents can co-reside for a longer period, depends on the
prevailing views of intergenerational relationships (Mayer 2001). In this case the cultural
factors shape institutional arrangements, meaning that to gain a complete understanding
of the dynamics underlying transitions to adulthood, we must necessarily examine
longstanding cultural differences across countries.
According to Reher (2005), the initial conditions from which modern societies
have developed are fundamental for the present differences in behavior. More precisely,
in Southern Europe the influence of Islam raised the importance of kinship and vertical
relationship between generations, so that the prolonged stay of children in their parent’s
home and the caring work of children towards their parents are two faces of the same
coin, a “strong” family. In the North, Germanic tradition and the Reformation contributed
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to the development of a “weak” family (Reher 2005). Empirical evidence shows that in
fact the share of young adults who affirm to be financially dependent on parents and
family members is much larger in Southern Europe rather than in Social Democratic and
liberal countries, where intergenerational ties are weaker (Billari 2004). The cultural
inheritance model (as the welfare regimes explanation) predicts that convergence will not
take place at national level: factors which lead to homogenization of behaviors
throughout the world, like those implied by modernization and economic globalization,
cannot have the same impact on societies with different cultural and historical origins,
and lead to diverse and possibly divergent coping behaviors and timing of transitions.

2.3 Hypotheses and Expectations on Transition to Adulthood Patterns
Having described recent comparative research, and the potential role of welfare states and
family ties in the transition to adulthood, it is possible now to develop some hypotheses
concerning different patterns in life course trajectories across countries, but also different
trends over time. With the help of Table 1.1 distinct groups of countries are identified,
and their characteristics concerning welfare regimes, cultural aspects, transition patterns
to adulthood, and trends over time are described.
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Table 1.1 Countries characteristics and typical patterns of transition to adulthood.
Group of
Countries

Scandinavian
Countries

Liberal
Countries

Welfare
State

School-to-Work
Transition

Welfare rights
and benefits
High completion rates
granted as
of tertiary education
individual
and widespread
entitlements;
vocational training
Unemployment
promote easier labor
benefits
market access
available for
young people.

Strong market
orientation,
loosely
regulated labor
market;
Means-tested
benefits
oriented to
individuals.

Weak regulation of
the labor market
supports an early
completion of
schooling and easy
access to the labor
market; However
labor markets are
characterized by high
instability.
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Culture &
Family Ties

Transition Patterns to
Adulthood

Weak family ties
that imply
individual's
priority over the
family.

High importance of young
people's autonomy, very
early home leaving and
union formation (mostly
cohabitation).

Weak family ties,
strong focus on
self-reliance and
autonomy

Early home leaving, early
school completion and
entry into the labor
market. This facilitates
early family formation.

Expected Changes
over Time
Minimum delay in all
the events of the
transition to adulthood;
Age at home leaving
not influenced by the
achievement of
economic
independence, so even
a postponement of the
entrance into the labor
market won't increase
the dependency from
the family of origin.
Limited postponement
in the age at home
leaving and at entry
into the job market.
Possible larger delay in
family formation due to
increased instability of
the labor market.
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Table 1.1 Continued.
Group of
Countries

Welfare
State

School-to-Work
Transition

Culture & Family
Ties

Transition Patterns to
Adulthood

Continental
Europe

Welfare
transfers
oriented to
families.

Strong vocational
education system;
Easy access to the
labor market even if at
later ages.

Stronger family
ties than in Liberal
and Scandinavian
countries, that are
reinforced by
family-oriented
welfare transfers.

Later age at school
completion and entrance
into the labor market; Later
age at home leaving and
achievement of economic
independence, but with
more stability to form a
family in a short time.

Southern
Europe

Weak
welfare
state
transfers,
mainly
familyoriented.

Late age at school
completion and no
vocational training
hinder an easy access
to stable jobs; Strong
senior worker
protection.

Strong family ties;
Family is the locus
of support for
young people.
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Expected Changes
over Time

More delay in the
timing of social and
economic independence,
and the postponement of
economic and
employment stability
may be a cause for
delayed home leaving.
Increased instability of
Very late age at home
labor market and
leaving; Having a stable job expansion of education
and economic selfcause a strong delay in
sufficiency are important
the entrance into the
conditions to form a family, labor market and in the
so also age at union
achievement of
formation and parenthood
independence;
are higher than in other
Consequent strong delay
countries.
in home leaving and
family formation.
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Based on country characteristics and previous findings in the literature, the following
hypotheses can be formulated and the aim of this work is to test them through an
empirical investigation:
1. Differences across countries
Events like the entry into the labor market, and the achievement of social and economic
independence from the family of origin happen earlier in Scandinavian and liberal
countries rather than in continental Europe. Also, these events take place at a much older
age in Southern Europe.
2. Changes over time
Given the expansion of education, and the increasing economic instability, there has been
a delay in the entry into the labor market, a delayed exit from the parental home, and a
delayed financial self-sufficiency among young adults in the last three decades. However,
this postponement is expected to be greater where welfare state transfers to young people
are weaker and family ties stronger (i.e. greatest in Southern Europe and smallest in
Northern Europe).
3. The Role of Education
The level of education of young adults and the increasing returns to education over time
can have a role in the life course trajectories and their trends over time. Current evidence
shows that across all developed societies young people from lower social class leave
school and start working earlier (Bynner 2005; Muller and Shavit 1998). Hence, it is
possible that they achieve financial independence earlier. However, low levels of
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education are usually associated with unstable partnerships and unstable employment
(Arts and Gelissen 2002; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Furstenberg 2008), thus increasing the
risk of future poverty. Hence by their late 20s and early 30s, people with high levels of
education may show a less evident postponement in the achievement of economic selfsufficiency.
4. The Role of Economic Independence to achieve Social Independence
It is possible that some people leave the parental home when they become financially
self-sufficient, but it is also possible that they do it earlier (because they found a partner,
or to go to college) or that they stay with parents even after they achieved financial
independence. We expect to find a higher probability of not living with parents among
those who achieved some sort of financial independence, even with some differences
across countries and over time. In fact, we expect to find a higher proportion of people
living with parents in more recent birth cohorts, especially among workers with low
wages. Nonetheless we expected this increase to be more limited in Scandinavian and
liberal countries, rather than continental and southern European countries. In Italy, for
example, when the labor market is not working efficiently young people have their family
as the locus of support given weak welfare state transfers addressed to youth.
Consequently, if they are not financially independent it is more likely that they stay home
with parents, while in other countries this is not necessarily the case.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the data and the
methods employed in the analysis. The following two sections present the results. In the
final part, we offer some concluding remarks.
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2.4 Data and Methods
The analyses in this work are carried out using the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS), a
data set that contains harmonized microdata from high- and middle-income countries
around the world. It started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, harmonizing data related to
socio-demographic variables and economic information, such as employment status, paid
hours of work, net income, in a few countries (U.S., U.K, Sweden, Germany and
Canada). LIS expanded over time and now includes 45 different countries. We select
datasets at individual level for 6 countries that are representative of the different patterns
in the transition to adulthood described above: United States (1986 and 2004), United
Kingdom (1986 and 2004), Germany (1984 1 and 2004), Italy (1987 and 2004),
Netherlands (1987 and 2004), Norway (1986 and 2004). These six countries portray
diverse experiences among young adults, and have different institutions and welfare
regimes. There are two countries representing the liberal welfare state, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Both are included in the analysis given that there are
large institutional and cultural differences between the two countries2. Also, there are two
countries belonging to the continental Europe group, Germany and the Netherlands.
However, the Netherlands is often characterized as having hybrid characteristics (Arts
and Gelissen 2002), some closer to the Scandinavian model (e.g. flexibility of the labor
market) and some other fitting with the conservative welfare regime (e.g. family
orientation of welfare transfers).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The 1984-survey for Germany does only include West-Germany regions.
First, the U.S. do have a unified welfare system, given that the federalism implies that many important
functions are held by the States, including public assistance, social care and various health schemes.
Secondly, there are profound cultural diversities due to distant historical patterns.
2
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The sources of the LIS are representative national surveys that provide detailed
data on demographics (gender, age, household composition, marital status, and education
level), and employment characteristics (labor force status, paid hours of work per week,
weeks worked per year, labor earnings). These national surveys are harmonized in order
to create national databases that are comparable and allow researchers to examine
similarities/differences across countries on the same ground. As far as the earlier surveys
are concerned, unfortunately we do not have the same year for all the six countries, but
we were able to select rounds within a 3-year span (1984-1987). There are some
limitations in the data that we need to mention. The main one is that the LIS datasets
collected in the mid-1980s do not contain information on self-employment income
(except for Germany in 1984), but only data on wages and earnings. The 2004 surveys
instead incorporate also data on self-employment income, but to have comparable
measures in both time periods we decided to consider salary income in our analysis. This
decision may affect our results, especially in countries where the share of people selfemployed – i.e. Italy – is high, underestimating the proportion of those who attained
economic independence, or where it increased/decreased over time.
In all the datasets we select individuals between 22 and 30 years of age, so that
we can compare young adults in the same age range but in two different time periods. In
the mid-1980s cohorts we investigate life trajectories of individuals born in the late1950s/early-1960s, while the 2004 surveys include people born between 1974 and 1982.
Table 1.2 shows some characteristics of the selected samples, by country and survey year.
As we can see from the table below the samples size varies quite a lot depending on the
country and on the size of the original sample – i.e. without restricting the age range. This
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may have some implications in terms of reliability of the estimates in the countries with a
smaller number of observations, especially when we perform the analysis by gender and
in age groups3. The mean age in the sample is around 26 in all countries, and the
proportion of women ranges between 39.2% (Italy in 1987) and 54.4% (Germany in
2004). As expected the proportion of people reporting a high level of education increases
over time, except for Germany. The way in which education level is classified is
established according to the ISCED97 (International Standard Classification of
Education) created by UNESCO. This classification recodes the highest completed level
of education – primary, secondary and tertiary – into three categories, low, medium and
high4. The greatest increase has been reported in the Netherlands, where only 12% in the
1987 sample have high education to 34.4% in the 2004 sample. The lowest level, or
better the smallest proportion of people with high education in 2004 has been found in
Germany (13.5%) and Italy (14.6%). In general the proportions in high education are not
extremely large, especially in Italy and Germany. This might be due to the fact that, given
length of education in some countries, it is essentially impossible to attain high education
in the early 20s, and so many who pursue tertiary education are not indicated as high
educated because they are still in school (and have not yet completed college, for
example).
The proportion of people in a co-residential union (cohabitation or marriage)
declined slightly in all countries, with some degree of variation. More important, this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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However, we try to keep the number of observation in each unit of analysis higher than 60 and we use weights
provided in the survey.
4
In the 1986 sample of UK this variable is not available. We use the age at completion of education to determine the
level of education, assuming that children enroll in school when they are 5 years old and complete high school when
they are about 16. The level of education is defined as low if the age at which they exit school is below 16, medium if
between 16 and 21, and high if greater or equal than 21.
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decline is fully explained by a decline in marriage, while the diffusion of cohabitation
functions as a countervailing factor in this trend. As a direct evidence that the transition
to adulthood has been postponed, the percentage of men and women between 22 and 30
years of age that lives with parents has increased over time. The only exception is
Norway, where it decreased by 9.5%. One possible explanation can be found in the
expansion of education and in the educational system, given that those going to college
tend to do so away from parents, and mainly live in university accommodations. Thus,
they leave home, but not necessarily because they have a job or are financially
independent. The proportion of those still living in the parental home increased only
slightly in Germany (0.9%), in the United States (3.1%) and in the United Kingdom
(3.5%), while more substantially in Italy: Italian young adults staying with parents in
2004 are 71.2%, a 13.8% increase compared to 1987. The delay in the formation of
independent household in Italy can be due to the high housing costs, cultural factors and
parental income gains (Bell et al. 2007; Giannelli and Monfardini 2000; Giuliano 2007;
Manacorda and Moretti 2002). Also the scarcity of public social transfers and the strong
family ties contribute to the postponement in leaving the parental home.
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics - Weighted, by country and year.

Mean Age
% Female
% with high education
% in a Union
% Married
% living with parents
% working "full-time"
Unemployment rate (%) *
Labor Force Particip. Rate (%) **
N

USA
1986
2004
26.2
25.9
52.0
49.9
25.5
33.5
53.9
46.2
49.6
37.9
20.3
23.4
63.3
48.7
7
5.5
74.9
75.9

UK
1986
2004
26.0
26.0
51.9
50.9
11.7
30.1
60.0
51.0
58.8
25.7
18.9
22.4
61.2
63.8
11.3
4.7
75.5
75.8

Germany
1984
2004
25.9
26.1
49.0
54.4
16.1
13.5
52.4
44.8
44.0
21.3
25.2
26.1
57.8
44.4
8.1
10.5
66.0
72.9

Italy
1987
2004
26.3
26.1
39.2
46.9
6.3
14.6
36.7
16.6
na
16.2
57.4
71.2
65.8
45.4
9.6
8
59.9
62.1

Norway
1986
2004
25.9
26.2
48.7
46.4
17.7
31.0
na
na
39.0
16.4
21.8
12.3
75.9
74.2
2.0
4.3
77.8
80.4

Netherlands
1987
2004
26.1
26.4
52.9
51.6
12.0
34.4
57.3
56.7
38.1
26.9
na
19.4
52.0
59.1
6.3
5.1
64.2
76.7

4,755

2,450

2,029

1,784

1,803

1,683

22,615

6,194

2,398

2,276

*Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database. n.b.: 1986 (1987 for Italy and Nethelands,
1984 for Germany)
**Source: UN Statistics Database. n.b.: 1986 (1987 for Italy and Nethelands, 1985 for Germany), average
between male and female LFPR
For Norway the % working full-time reflects only those who state to be employed (no info
on hours and weeks of work)
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One of the main outcomes of our analysis is the proportion of young adults
working full-time. Secure, full-time employment is defined as working more than 35
hours per week and more than 40 weeks per year5. The percentage working full-time
decreases over time in each country, but in Netherlands and United Kingdom (where it
increases by 7.1% and 2.6%, respectively). The reduction is very modest in Norway,
whereas it is 14.6% in the United States and 13.4% in Germany. Again, Italy shows the
largest decline with a 20.4% drop in the percentage working full-time. This is consistent
with the argument that in Italy, and more generally in southern Europe the delay in the
transition to adulthood – starting from leaving the parental home and being full-time
employed – is greater than in other European countries or in the US. Not always these
figures are consistent with the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate at
macro level (bottom of Table 1.2), but usually where the decline in the unemployment
rate has been very small, or there was an increase in unemployment rate, the proportion
of those working full-time in our sample decreased the most. Also it is possible that more
people are working, but less are employed full-time.
The first step of our investigation is to present some descriptive graphs showing
the employment status of the individuals in the selected samples. We produce graphs
distinguishing between men and women, and between the mid-1980s and the 2004
samples. Secondly, we look at the proportion of surveyed young adults who are not
classified as low-paid workers, considering their wages and labor earnings. To establish if
a person is a low-paid worker or not we use the OECD definition, i.e. if the wage is lower
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

Unfortunately in the UK surveys and in the 1987-survey for Netherlands we have information only on hours worked
per week, and in the Germany 1984-survey only on weeks worked per year. In addition, for the Norway data, we only
know if surveyed individuals are employed or unemployed.
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than two thirds of median earnings. Therefore we build a relative measure of earnings
within the sample: we compute the individual median income in each sample of those
who are employed (Table 1.3) – one for each country and for each wave – and we define
a person as a non low-paid worker if his/her earnings are higher than two thirds of the
median income. This measure is not an objective measure of financial independence,
because economic self-sufficiency is determined by many different factors, such as by the
cost of living (housing, food), by public or private transfers, access to credit and future
streams of incomes and financial obligations. For example, young adults may decide to
go to graduate school, so they will achieve financial self-sufficiency at an older age.
However, this investment can pay off and give them a more secure job with a higher
wage. It is difficult to establish whether economic independence should be evaluated
using current income, if any, or the discounted flow of future earnings. Also, the measure
we use in this work is an individual measure that does not take into account the
household size, the number of dependent children, partner’s income etc. Even with the
mentioned limitation, it gives a sense of the level of wages in each country, by age and
sex, and shows changes in trends over time. The probability of being employed, and even
more the level of wages are positively correlated to the level of education. This is
especially true in contexts where in the last forty years education expanded and returns to
education (mainly college) increased. For this reason we also examine the trends of the
proportion of low-paid workers dividing people in the sample by level of education. It is
possible that the postponement in the transition to adulthood or simply the changes in the
transition occurred in a different way among people with different level of education. We
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might expect a greater delay for those with low education, and also a greater recuperation
in the delay among those with a college degree or more.
Finally, we are interested in understanding how the level of wages is related to the
probability of living with parents. Being self-sufficient is not a necessary condition to
leave the parental home (for example, college students), but it is surely one of the most
important steps that can induce young adults to establish his/her own independent
household. To investigate this issue more deeply we use logistic regressions to predict at
each age the probability that an individual will live with parents depending on their being
low-paid workers or not. Some controls are also included in the regressions, such as
gender and the level of education. The results are presented in the next two sections and
will help to understand more carefully the dynamics behind the transitions to adulthood
in different countries and in different time periods. As already said, results are presented
for men and women separately, given that ages at which they exit school, leave their
parents’ home, and start working differ considerably by gender, particularly in the 1980s.
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Table 1.3 Median Income of Those Employed
Median Income of those
working

Currency

Low-Paid
Income

PPP Conversion
Factor

Low Paid
Income in USD

1986
2004

13,000
22,000

USD
USD

8,666.7
14,667

1.00
1.00

8,666.7
14,666.7

1986
2004
Germany
1984
2004
Italy
1987
2004
Norway
1986
2004
Netherlands
1987
2004

6,245
15,432

GBP
GBP

4,163.0
10,288

0.58
0.64

7,204.9
16,133.0

25,500
14,520

DEM
EUR

17,000.0
9,680.0

1.10
0.91

7,911.0
10,667.4

13,000,000
11,000

LIRA
EUR

8,666,667
7,333

0.70
0.91

6,408.7
8,068.0

115,474
236,690.5

NOK
NOK

76,982.7
157,793.7

9.23
9.80

8,341.8
16,096.6

32,340
23,037.5

NLG
EUR

21,560.0
15,358

1.00
0.92

9,818.9
16,704.9

Country
USA

UK

Source for PPP Conversion Factor: World Bank Database.
Low-Paid Income corresponds to two thirds of the median income.
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2.5 Employment trends and economic self-sufficiency in the Western world
As mentioned, the first set of results that we present refers to the employment conditions
of young men and women in the six countries of the selected sample. Figure 1.1 reports
the proportion of men and women working full-time by time periods and by age. In order
to compute the proportion in each category we used person weights included in the LIS,
so to take into account the sampling probability and the different age structures in
different countries. The proportion of young men and women working full-time
decreased over time in the United States, Germany and Italy. In the United Kingdom the
percentages among men are lower in 2004 than in 1986 but only at lower ages. By age 25
and 26 the proportions breakeven and by age 30 more people are working full-time in
2004 than in 1986. Among English women, except for the age interval 22-24, the
proportions are higher in 2004 than in 1986. The delay in the entry into full-time
employment and the fast recuperation as age increases may be related to education
expansion. As a matter of fact those with high education in 2004 are 30.1%, compared to
11.7% in 1986. Netherlands is the only country where the proportion increased for both
men and women. The gap between 2004 and 1987, however, decreased over age for
males, while it increased among females showing a substantial growth in the female labor
force participation. Also in Norway we observe a large upshift in the proportion of
women employed, and the gradient increased with age. The same is not true for men,
given that the share of males employed is lower in 2004 than in 1986 at each age (even if
the differences reduce when age goes up). In general, the age gradient is positive among
men and flatter among women (except for Norway). Comparing levels of different
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countries in the 1980s we observe that percentages for men are distant in the age range
22-24, but differences decrease as respondents get older, if we do not consider Norway
where only the proportion employed is reported.
In 2004 instead, we have to distinguish between UK and Netherlands where the
proportions are very similar and at a high level, and USA, Italy and Germany that adjust
on a lower level. Among women in the 1980s we observe the opposite picture, with a
lower range across countries at young ages that increases by the time female respondents
have 28-30 years old. In 2004, even if women start at lower and more dispersed levels,
they recuperate as they get older and there is more convergence across countries (with
percentages between 37.2 and 49.9, with a peak of 86.7% for Norway that again refers to
women employed, and not employed full-time). Moreover, the gender gap has shrunk
over time everywhere except for Netherlands, even with some cross-national variation.
Before commenting the results concerning levels of wages, we briefly need to discuss the
way in which wages are reported for different countries in the LIS database. Italy is the
only country in our sample to report after-tax wages, while all the others register pretaxes salaries. Hence, taxes that most workers pay on their payroll are already deducted
among Italian employees. This can give a biased picture of net earnings in all the other
countries studied in the analysis, based on the difference in tax systems.
!
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Figure 1.1 Percentage of men and women working “full-time”, by country and year!
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For this reason it is important to pay attention when interpreting the results on
economic self-sufficiency, even though the measure we use is a relative one and refers to
a specific country in a specific year. Figure 1.2 shows that both among men and among
women there is an increase in the dispersion of trajectories across countries from 1980s to
2004. This means that differences in the proportions of those who are not low-paid
workers among countries are smaller in the mid 1980s than in 2004. As a matter of fact
the range is at least 10% wider in 2004 at all ages. In the United States the gap existing
between 1986 and 2004 is much lower than the one related to employment status. This
means that even if fewer American people are employed full-time, not many of them are
low-paid workers. Importantly, the gap between men and women is smaller in 2004 than
in 1986, also because the ability of women to support themselves with earnings in the US
has improved over time. In the UK instead, the picture is more coherent with the one
presented on employment conditions, even if among English men the recuperation
process is slower and only at age 27 the proportion not “low-paid” in 2004 starts
converging to the 1986 proportion. For women the opposite is true, given that if by age
28-30 in 2004 71.3% of men are not low-paid workers, as opposed to 69.5% in 1986, half
of the women (51.6%) became independent showing a 24.3% increase compared to 1986.
In Germany we observe a steep increase with age. The proportion of independent German
men is higher in 1984 than in 2004, but percentages get closer when age goes up, while
the share is higher in 2004 for women 25 years old and older. A similar situation – with
an improvement over time for females and a deterioration for men – can be found in all
the other countries, but Italy. In fact, in Italy the proportions for women decrease more
than those for men over time. We can conclude that the achievement of independence is
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easier among women in all countries, with the exception of Italy, in 2004 than in the mid1980s – probably due to the increase in female labor force participation – while the
picture has not changed substantially among men, and if so it worsened. Moreover,
compared to full-time employment, results show greater variability, both across countries
and over age. The opportunity to live independently with labor earnings does not occur in
a smooth way and the process to get there is de-standardized and unpredictable.
The role that education plays in the transition to adulthood, especially in the first
steps such as entry into the labor market and achievement of economic self-sufficiency, is
not negligible. As with unemployment, wage levels have become more correlated with
education level. Shifts in the labor market toward higher-skilled jobs have eroded wages
for many with the least education, leading to growing income inequality. Young adults,
who decide to go to college or graduate studies after that, will achieve financial selfsufficiency at an older age than those who do not go to college. However, investing in
more education can pay off in the long run and can lead to a more secure job and a higher
standard of living. To present results more effectively, when we look at the proportion of
men and women who are low-paid and non low-paid workers by age and education level,
we show the percentage change over time, and so the percentage difference between 2004
and mid-1980s. Hence, in Figure 1.3 and 1.46 – presenting results for men and women
respectively – if we observe a positive change it means that the proportion with a higher
level of earnings increased over time.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

Numbers used to produce Figures 1.3 and 1.4 con be found in the Appendix (Tables 1.A1 and 1.A2)
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Figure 1.2 Percentage of men and women who are NOT low-paid workers, by country and year!
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Starting from men (Figure 1.3), we notice that in the UK, Germany and
Netherlands if there is any improvement in the economic conditions of young adults it
happens among the high-educated individuals. In other words, the negative changes over
time get smaller as education increases. In Italy, on the contrary, there are more positive
changes among low-educated men than among middle- and high-educated ones. Some
categories for Italy are missing because the units of analysis were too small. This result
can be driven by the fact that the percentage of those with high education is still low, and
also that if Italian men decide to stay in school they might stay enrolled longer or take a
long time to finish college (longer than in other countries at least). Moreover, mostly
because of cultural factors, full-time students in Italy do not work and are supported by
families. So they start earning their own money later in life, and this can worsen or delay
their ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency. In the United States changes, positive
and negative, are very small even if more positive at low level of education. In Norway
there are negative changes, independent on the level of education. However, the
difference between low-educated and mid- and high-educated men is still non negligible
(with smaller decrease over time).
The picture for women displayed in Figure 1.4 shows more positive changes,
confirming the improvements observed in figures 1.1 and 1.2. In the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany and Netherlands there are still some negative changes, but
they get smaller and smaller when the level of education increases, and the positive
changes are greater among females with high education. Among Italian women there are
no positive spreads. The number of women with high education is too low, so we do not
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report the results for that group. It would be ideal to follow these women over time in
order to investigate whether improvements will become visible in their mid- or late
thirties. Norwegian women are in a peculiar situation: there are improvements over
education for older ages (28-30 years old), but negative changes for those in the youngest
categories (22-24 years old). Overall we can claim that the postponement is less evident
among those with higher levels of education, either because young adults with high
education in the mid-1980s were leaving school and entering the job market later in life,
or because for individuals with a college degree or more in 2004 is easier to find a secure
job paying higher wages than for those with low education.

2.6 Economic independence and living arrangements
The data portrayed in Figures 1.1-1.4 suggest (but do not necessarily demonstrate) that
young adults in the later cohorts delay other adult transitions (home leaving, partnership
and parenthood) because they have lower earnings at comparable ages, at least as far as
men are concerned. It is possible they are deferring labor market commitments that would
bring them greater earnings capacity for other reasons. One event in the transition to
adulthood, that is related if not determined by economic conditions, is the departure from
parental home. We explore the possible relationship between level of wages and living
arrangements of young adults, by predicting the probability of people in the sample to
live together with parents based on their financial conditions. It is important to look at
other characteristics of young people in the sample in order to gain more information on
how they navigate the transition to adulthood.
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Figure 1.3 Percentage change over time of men who achieved economic self-sufficiency, by country and education level
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Figure 1.4 Percentage change over time of women who achieved economic self-sufficiency, by country!and!education!level7!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Most of the differences over time and across countries that we presented in Figures 1.1-1.4 are significant, especially when the difference is greater than 2%. We do not show it
on the graphs not to make them more complex and difficult to read, but we can provide confidence intervals upon request.
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Delay can occur because it is more difficult to find a job and earn enough to form a
separate household, and all other events are postponed accordingly. In this case,
structural changes in the labor market that occurred in the last three decades would be
responsible for the postponement. But it may also be the case that delay is occurring
because of something else, such as a deeper normative and cultural change, and that even
with a stable job and a secure wage, young adults in 2004 decide to wait longer to move
out and start their own families. Consequently, it is relevant to investigate whether those
in 2004 who have adequate earnings still postpone, or whether they leave the parental
home at the same age as young adults in the mid-1980s. The cross-national comparison
allows us also to investigate whether the context matters in the relationship between
economic conditions and the decision to live with parents or to move out. The high costs
in the housing market can delay the decision to leave the parental home until labor
earnings are high enough to bear a rent (or a mortgage). So even if wages are above the
threshold for low-paid workers, young adults can still decide to stay with parents and
save some money, especially if the family supports them (as it happens in Italy). It is also
possible that the government through public transfers can facilitate the exit from parents’
house and speed up the process.
Figure 1.5 shows the predicted probability of living with parents, by gender8, age,
and economic conditions resulting from a set of logistic regressions in which we also
control for education level9. In each graph we actually report the percentage change in the
predicted probability of living with parents between the mid-1980s and 2004 for each
country. On the left part of the figure we produce the chart if respondents are low-paid
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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9

We do not have information about living arrangements for Netherlands.
For the predictions we set education level at the mean value.
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workers, while on the right if they are not. We know that generally there is an increasing
trend over time in the proportion of young adults staying with parents (except for
Norway, see Table 1.2). However this trend is not uniform and possibly not driven by the
same motivations. Hence we expect to find a percentage change greater than zero
between 1980s and 2004, but with a different magnitude in different countries. Moreover,
we would expect this increase to be lower among financially independent people, so to be
lower among those who are non low-paid workers – assuming that being in good
financial conditions helps young adults to move out from their parents’ house. Among
low-paid men we observe an increase in the predicted probability of living with parents in
all countries except for Norway, and the United States at younger ages (until age 26).
This “positive” change however is lower than 3% in the United Kingdom and than 7% in
Germany. In Italy instead, the change is substantial. Between 1987 and 2004 the
probability of living with parents increases also by more than 40%, and it increases the
most among older respondents. The difference with respect to workers who are not low
paid is very modest in the U.S., in the UK, and in Germany. The decrease in the predicted
probability that we observed in Norway is smaller in this category, while the large
increase detected in Italy shrinks a lot. So it seems that in Italy it is important to have a
solid financial background to be able to move out from parental home, while in other
countries the difference is very modest. Among women we find more variations across
countries. If we consider low-paid women, we find that only in Norway the change is
negative, meaning that the probability of living with parents decreases between 1986 and
2004. The increase is still very low in the United States, and it is 17.6% in the UK at age
22, but it decreases to zero by age 30. In Germany and in Italy the increase is larger.
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However, in Germany it starts at 20% for very young women and decreases when age
goes up, showing a delay in leaving the parental home but a convergence before age 30.
In Italy the increase is smaller at age 22 (only 5%), and it goes up to 27% by age 30,
showing a delay that does increase with age. When we move to non low-paid women we
can see how the level of wages can play a role. As a matter of fact, the percentage change
is still negative in Norway, but it becomes negative also in the UK and in Germany. In
the United States there is almost no change between 1986 and 2004. Italy is the only
country where we still find an increase in the predicted probability of living with parents.
However, this probability increases less than for low-paid women.
Summing up, it seems that attaining economic independence or having a job paying a
good wage has a role in the change over time of young adults’ living arrangements.
However this role is not the same in all countries and across gender. First being in good
financial conditions helps avoiding or reducing the delay in leaving the parental home
among women, but it does not make a big difference among men. Consequently, there is
something else that is not related to wage structure and labor market changes behind the
decision of leaving the parental home for men. Among these factors we can mention
housing costs, family ties, and culture. Also, the Italian picture seems to show that the
postponement of leaving home is substantial and not strictly related to economic
conditions, and so most likely related to cultural factors. Further research is needed to
investigate these issues.

51
!

!
!

Figure 1.5 % Change (1980s-2004) in the predicted probability of living with parents based on level of wage
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2.7 Discussion and concluding remarks
!
To investigate how the transition to adulthood has changed in the Western developed
world we started from two fundamental steps in the process, entry into the labor market
with a full-time job and attainment of satisfactory level of wages. Financial independence
is a complex concept, and it is hard to define exactly when and how young adults achieve
it. In this work we decided to focus on earnings and to look at those who are defined as
low-paid workers versus those who are not, according to the OECD definition. Of course
there are some limitations due to the fact that we consider a relative measure computed
within the selected sample – one for each time period and for each country. This can
cause some biases, also because we do not consider other sources of income that may
enable young adults to live independently, such as self-employment income, social and
public transfers, partner’s or family income, loans, etc.
Being aware of these limitations, the picture that is presented evaluating the
proportion of those employed full-time and who are not low-paid workers is not
particularly reassuring. There is a general decreasing trend in the percentage working
more than 35 hours per week and 40 weeks per year, and earning enough to be in good
financial conditions. This happens mainly among men, and in some countries we observe
a convergence when age increases (e.g. in UK, U.S. and Netherlands), but in some other
countries the delay has not been recuperated by age 30. The situation is more positive for
women, who are more active in the labor force in 2004 than in the mid-1980s. There are
still places where the proportions are well below those of the 1980s, for example in
Germany and Italy, but the general trend is positive. This has also a positive influence on
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their level of wages, given that in all countries, but Italy, by age 30 the proportion of
females who achieved economic independence is higher in 2004 than in the 1980s. These
two parallel but divergent processes occurring among men and among women start to
close the gap and reduce the distance prevailing in the mid-1980s between sexes. Males
and females’ careers – or the way they face the transition to adulthood – become more
similar over time, and even if the gap is very similar in 2004 and 1980s at young ages, it
decreases as age increases (with proportions for men that are still always higher).
Moreover, we have seen how the postponement has been less drastic among those with
high education.
Despite some general similarities across countries, substantial differences still
remain and do not seem to reconcile over time. The delays in the transition towards
economic self-sufficiency are limited in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in
the Netherlands. Norway is in an intermediate position with a delay that is more
pronounced among men, and high variability across ages. Germany, and in particular
Italy are the two countries with the most visible postponement and the lowest proportions
of young adults who attained satisfactory levels of earnings. Hence, it is evident how
contexts matter, and the results are to some extent linked to the structure of the labor
market and welfare state systems.
However, there are some results and some trends that cannot be entirely
reconciled with structural factors. Some other determinants could explain these findings.
Elements like culture and social norms, on top of family ties, can play an important role
in shaping the life course trajectories. They can be responsible for the variation across
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countries that cannot be explained through structural factors related to the labor market.
Moreover, women’s findings cannot be simply explained by differences in welfare
regimes or institutions. Therefore, there a lot of aspects that should be investigated in
future research, starting from the influence that culture and social norms have on the
transition to adulthood and their ability to explain differences across countries. Also it
would be interesting to investigate the way in which the entry into the labor market and
the achievement of economic independence are related to the other steps of the transition,
and to focus more on the women’s side of the story that is much more diverse and
innovative.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 1.A1: MEN, Able to support themselves w/ earnings
Low Education Level Medium Education Level High Education Level
United States
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
United Kingdom
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Germany
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Italy
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Norway
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Netherlands
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30

1986
30.8
53.0
46.0

2004
35.6
52.8
50.3

1986
53.5
66.8
70.5

2004
44.6
62.9
70.5

1986
60.1
76.3
83.3

2004
53.5
72.3
81.9

1986
57.1
50.0
62.2

2004
41.6
57.0
47.5

1986
67.3
70.5
71.1

2004
57.6
66.4
73.5

1986
69.0
84.6
78.6

2004
68.8
80.8
82.7

1984
43.8
75.8
85.2

2004
23.2
55.5
57.8

1984
43.5
67.7
76.7

2004
33.7
51.2
69.2

1984
33.4
60.8
71.9

2004
44.3
46.4
70.7

1987
57.4
77.0
69.7

2004
43.1
55.7
67.1

1987
77.4
78.5
73.7

2004
na
49.9
57.6

1987
na
na
68.0

2004
17.5
33.1
46.6

1986
67.7
70.9
66.9

2004
38.4
49.6
40.1

1986
61.9
73.9
80.2

2004
49.5
61.9
68.6

1986
55.8
77.5
92.5

2004
na
54.3
79.1

1987
62.3
74.7
74.6

2004
56.7
67.2
72.3

1987
52.4
68.2
87.8

2004
69.7
69.4
79.9

1987
19.6
43.3
61.1

2004
36.8
64.6
81.8
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Table 1.A2: WOMEN, Able to support themselves w/ earnings
Low Education Level Medium Education Level High Education Level
United States
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
United Kingdom
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Germany
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Italy
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Norway
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30
Netherlands
Age
22-24
25-27
28-30

1986
12.3
10.2
18.2

2004
12.9
17.9
14.9

1986
36.7
45.4
44.5

2004
31.0
41.9
42.8

1986
45.6
61.4
69.7

2004
46.7
64.0
66.3

1986
26.7
28.1
18.6

2004
21.0
17.3
16.4

1986
48.0
38.2
27.4

2004
42.6
44.1
45.1

1986
75.7
70.5
45.5

2004
74.3
83.0
77.4

1984
36.8
30.5
38.6

2004
22.2
16.9
12.2

1984
44.6
48.0
39.7

2004
36.3
49.3
50.8

1984
58.6
54.9
45.5

2004
34.3
58.7
65.4

1987
60.5
64.4
67.1

2004
22.7
25.5
31.8

1987
53.7
56.6
70.6

2004
15.8
45.7
41.3

1987
na
77.6
80.5

2004
na
na
na

1986
27.5
16.0
24.4

2004
21.5
13.4
31.3

1986
44.1
40.2
29.8

2004
35.4
38.0
54.0

1986
40.1
58.9
67.5

2004
28.4
58.4
64.5

1987
39.5
24.4
30.4

2004
20.0
30.3
21.8

1987
57.9
57.8
44.2

2004
53.2
66.9
52.9

1987
22.6
32.1
65.5

2004
49.5
71.1
77.7
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3. Chapter 2: “Trends in Economic Independence of Young Adults in
the United States: 1973-2007”.10
3.1 Introduction

!
The transition to adulthood since the late 1970s has become increasingly complicated and
prolonged compared to the very swift passage that occurred in the post-World War II
era.11 Typically, the demographic package of adult transitions has included such markers
as leaving home, finishing education, securing a job, and marrying or cohabiting, and
having children (Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006). In the post-war years, the
transition occurred quickly (usually by age 25 for both men and women) and in an
orderly sequence beginning with school completion, full-time work, and home-leaving.
Since then, the transition has lengthened and become more circuitous.
Public and scientific discussion over why the transition to adulthood changed so
suddenly has not yet reached any consensus on this question. Clarifying this question
involves, we contend, understanding when and how economic self-sufficiency is attained.
There has been considerable speculation that shifts in the labor market require more
education and training to become economically secure enough to establish a family
(Berlin, Furstenberg and Waters 2010b). Moreover, the structure of the U.S. labor market
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

This chapter is co-authored by Frank Furstenberg (University of Pennsylvania). A slightly different version of this
chapter is published as: Sironi M., Furstenberg F. (2012), “Trends in Economic Independence of Young Adults in the
United States: 1973-2007”, Population and Development Review, 38(4) 609-630
11
Even though the delay in the transition is less pronounced in the United States than in some countries in Europe –
such as Italy and Spain, where today young adults leave home in their late 20s, between 5 and 7 years later than those
leaving home in the 1960s and 1970s – over the last three decades, Americans have experienced large changes in rates
of household formation and dissolution. Age at leaving parental home, age at marriage and rates of non-marriage,
extra-marital childbearing and divorce have all risen (Aassve, Arnstein, Simon Burgess, Andrew Chesher, and Carol
Propper. 2002b. "Transitions from home to marriage of young Americans." Journal of Applied Econometrics 17(1):123, Billari, Francesco C., and Chris Wilson. 2001. "Convergence towards diversity? Cohort dynamics in the transition
to adulthood in contemporary Western Europe." MPIDR Working Papers Max Planck Institute for Demographic
Research, Rostock, Germany(WP-2001-039).
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itself has been reformed significantly in the last 30-40 years in the face of global
competitive pressure. Increase in earnings inequality, in employment instability, and
shortening of job tenure due to higher turnover are some of the most relevant changes
that occurred since 1970s. Together with these structural changes, youths’ expectations
about what it takes to live independently have risen, along with the actual costs of living.
This paper explores the trends in the achievement of economic self-sufficiency
over time by comparing the life course of young adults in 1973, 1987 and in 2007, using
data from the National Longitudinal Surveys in 1966 (NLS Original Cohorts), in 1979
(NLSY79) and 1997 (NLSY97). These three data sets enable us to compare individuals
between ages 22 and 30 in 1973, 1987 and 2007, while accounting for the role of
educational attainment and family background. Our research builds on a line of previous
research suggesting that it takes longer today to build the human capital necessary to
establish economic independence and as a consequence, a growing number of young
adults may linger for a long time in a state of semi-autonomy.
The next section presents a review of the past works on labor market outcomes
and economic self-sufficiency, trying to reflect about the causes of its postponement.
After describing the specific contributions of our study we present our samples and the
methodological strategy for the empirical analysis. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 report our
findings, and section 3.6 concludes.

3.2 Background
!
Previous research has demonstrated that the transition to adulthood since the late 1970s
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has become increasingly complicated (Aassve et al. 2002b; Furstenberg 2010; Settersten,
Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006). Financial independence is a fundamental step to be
considered an adult, associated with – but not identical to – full-time employment. As
noted by Yelowitz (Yelowitz 2005) in an article discussing the widely-held perception
that the transition to adulthood has become longer, many young people (aged 19-28) in
the US do not consider themselves “financially independent enough” to be an adult. The
achievement of economic self-sufficiency, however, has been delayed together with the
other events leading to adulthood, possibly due to reduced economic opportunities and to
the stagnation of real wages for many groups of American workers during the 1970s and
1980s (Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Katz and Autor 1999). Changes in the
labor market over the past forty years, e.g. technological changes in the production
process, spread of globalization, the decline of unionization, etc. made it more difficult
for young adults to attain economic stability and self-sufficiency (Danziger and Ratner
2010; Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996).
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that it takes longer today to achieve a
wage that permits economic autonomy and, in particular, enough to establish a separate
household and support a family (Danziger and Rouse 2007; Smeeding and Phillips 2002).
Earnings levels became uniformly lower over the 1970s and the 1980s, at least for male
workers. Moreover, failure to obtain a college degree or dropping out of high school
dramatically decreases the probability of earning a middle-class wage. For many lesseducated individuals, unemployment has become a substantial problem, with their
unemployment rates significantly higher than those of more educated people. This is
especially true for disadvantaged minorities. As with unemployment, wage levels have
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become more correlated with education level. Shifts in the labor market toward higherskilled jobs have eroded wages for many with the least education, leading to growing
income inequality. Within low-skilled jobs, mobility is also reduced, lowering the
possibilities of advancement on the job. Further, jobs overall have also become less stable
over time. This created greater uncertainties about young adults’ ability and willingness
to take on adult responsibilities, and about their long-term socioeconomic characteristics
(Duncan, Boisjoly and Smeeding 1996; Hill and Holzer 2006; Oppenheimer 1988). Even
when social transfers are taken into account, a significant proportion of young people
remain unable to support themselves, and much less a family, before their mid- to late
twenties (Smeeding and Phillips 2002).
These outcomes may also contribute to delays in other markers of the transition to
adulthood, such as completing education, establishing independent living arrangements,
marrying and having children. Certainly, the employment and earning changes of the past
four decades have affected the transition to adulthood in ways that vary sharply by gender
and education. Education expansion has been more substantial among women, who
started from a lower level and managed to catch up with men in getting college degrees
and enrolling in graduate studies. The same is true for the labor force participation rate,
given that its increase for females has been much more pronounced. If young males with
a low level of education take longer now than they did in the mid-1970s to become selfsufficient and to earn enough to support a family by working steadily in a job with good
wages and benefits, young women are more likely to attain self-sufficiency now than they
were in the mid-1970s (Danziger and Ratner 2010).
The changing economic situation of young men and women has potentially
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important implications for the second phase of adult transitions, union formation and
parenthood. Career opportunities and earnings, in fact, affect decisions about marriage
and parenthood differently by gender. Among men, steady employment and earnings are
positively associated with marriage and childbearing (Becker 1981; Blossfeld and
Drobnič 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Gibson-Davis 2009; Gibson-Davis, Edin and
McLanahan 2005). For women, the picture is more complex. The new home economics
(Becker 1965; Mincer 1962) hypothesis is that women’s economic independence is the
main reason behind delayed marriage and motherhood in industrialized countries. This
independence effect is driven by better education and career opportunities, with
consequent higher wages, which enable women to forgo marriage. Gains from marriage
and role specialization within marriage dissipate with women’s growing investments in
human capital and careers. The higher their level of education and the better their job
opportunities, the more likely women are to postpone or even avoid marriage and
motherhood. An alternative hypothesis, with different implications, is that women’s
earnings contribute to a couple’s higher standard of living, which encourages marriage
(income effect). Which scenario dominates is not clear yet and appears to be dependent
on other factors such as local and country context, birth cohort, and educational
attainment (Harknett and Kuperberg 2009; Sweeney 2002).

There are several reasons behind these changes in labor market outcomes and
economic self-sufficiency among young adults. One important factor explaining the delay
in the achievement of financial independence is the expansion of education that took
place in the last 40 years. Today it takes longer to build the human capital necessary to
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establish economic independence and as a consequence, a growing number of young
adults may linger for a long time in a state of semi-autonomy. As a matter of fact, by
spending more time in school they are delaying economic independence and temporarily
giving up job earnings, but they are improving their capacity to earn good wages in the
future (Bell et al. 2007).
Beginning in the 1970s – and until the late 1980s – the U.S. economy began to
experience periods of great instability. Some date the end of rapid real earnings growth
and the beginning of slower growth in 1973 after the oil embargo that resulted in a deep
recession. At the same time there was an acceleration in the growth of earnings
inequality, especially among men (Levy and Murnane 1992). For both men and women,
increased inequality in earnings was driven by increased wage variation rather than
increased variation in hours worked. The supply shifts alone, however, cannot explain the
rapid changes in income inequality. Also the demand for skilled workers relative to
unskilled ones played an important role.
During the 1970s the large baby boom cohort entered the labor market creating
what has been called the Easterlin Effect. Easterlin’s argument theorizes cyclical changes
in demographic and social behavior as the result of fluctuations in birth rates and cohort
size during the post-World War II period. Large cohort size reduces the economic
opportunities of its members and reduces income relative to smaller parental generations
(Jeon and Shields 2005; Macunovich 2011; Pampel and Peters 1995). “Low relative
economic status in turn leads to lower fertility, higher rates of female labor force
participation, later marriage, higher divorce and illegitimacy” (Pampel and Peters 1995).
There are mixed findings related to Easterlin’s theory, some providing support (Jeon and
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Shields 2005; Macunovich 2011) and some others claiming that the change in relative
cohort size was not predictive – or at least powerfully predictive – of changes in labor
market outcomes and social behaviors (Pampel 1993). Even considering the Easterlin
effect as true and effective, it can explain only in part the worsening of economic
conditions of young adult that has been constant over time since the 1970s. The Easterlin
effect should have resulted in cycles in economic opportunities and financial
independence in the ensuing decades that have not been observed.
In sum, the structure of the U.S. labor market has changed substantially in the last
four decades to face global competitive pressure, decline of unionization, and the raise of
jobs demanding high human capital. During this period, a decline occurred in tenure and
long-term employment relationships, with a subsequent increase in the proportion of
workers with short-term contracts. Despite the sustained growth in employment in the
United States until the Recession of 2007-08, there is longstanding concern that the
quality of the stock of well-paying jobs in the economy is deteriorating. Stable jobs with
high wages have been replaced by service sector jobs, that report high rates of turnovers,
low wages and frequently by part-time employment. Employers need to rely more on
temporary workers, on subcontractors, and on part-time workers, because they need more
flexibility to face greater uncertainty regarding product demand (Farber 2007).
Along with these structural changes, youths’ expectations about what it takes to
live independently have risen, along with the actual costs of living. The cost of housing,
for example, rose in the last decades, especially from 2000 to 2005, before coming to a
sudden halt in August 2008 with the severe economic crisis. Furthermore, expenditures
on children in dual-parent households (middle income) increased on average by 20
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percent from 1960 to 2008) (Lino and Carlson 2009). The main drivers of this growth can
be found in housing costs, health care expenditures, childcare and education,
transportation costs, and clothing. The higher costs of living and of raising a child
contributed to growing attitudes that a full-time job was insufficient to live independently
and build a new, independent household. Yelowitz (Yelowitz 2007) tried to assess how
changes in the cost of housing, transportation, and childcare affect living arrangement
decisions, and he found that there is a significant effect of housing and transportation
costs in the expected direction: the higher the costs, the lower the percentage of young
adults living independently. In particular, the results show that rising real housing costs
can explain 15% of the total change in independent house living arrangements in the U.S.
between 1980 and 2000.
Some researchers, though not dismissing the structural roots associated with the
extension of education and changes in the labor market for young adults, contend that the
changes in the timing of adult transitions can be partially explained by a shift in cultural
norms regarding home-leaving and family formation. In this paper we do not specifically
consider the possible effect of normative and cultural changes, but we only take into
account the growing interest in the role that families and parental socioeconomic status
may play in shaping life course trajectories. The precise mechanisms by which family
background and socioeconomic status affect the transition to adulthood and the ability to
achieve economic self-sufficiency are largely unknown, but presumably include factors
such as role modeling, labor market connections, neighborhood influences and parents’
ability to make monetary investments in their children. Moreover, the association
between parents’ socioeconomic status and young adult outcomes may also reflect the
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intergenerational transmission of genetic traits such as intelligence or motivation (Guldi,
Page and Stevens 2007).

This paper examines three specific research questions related to the changing barriers to
gaining financial independence:
1: How has timing of the entry into the labor market and of the achievement of financial
independence changed since 1970s?
2: How do the trends differ between younger men and women? Has there been
convergence between men and women in employment and financial indepence
trajectories over time?
3: How do the changes in the transition to adulthood over time differ by social class and
family background? Is the role of parental socio-economic status changing over time?

3.3 Data and Methods
3.3.1 Data
!
The NLSY are a series of nationally representative samples of young men and women,
designed to gather information at multiple points in time on their labor market activities
and other significant life events. In this study, we use the NLS Original Cohorts (NLS
hereafter), and both the NLSY79 and NLSY97. The first one began in 1966 for men and
1968 for women, interviewing 5,225 young men and 5,159 young women who were age
14-24 (born between 1941 and 1954). The NLSY79 began in 1979 with the survey of
12,686 young men and women who were age 14-22 (born between 1957 and
1964). These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and are currently
interviewed biennially. The NLSY97 consists of a nationally representative sample of
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approximately 9,000 youths who were age 12–16 in December 31, 1996 (born between
1980 and 1984). Round 1 of the survey took place in 1997 and respondents are
interviewed annually. All these surveys are implemented to document the transition from
school to work and into adulthood.
Substantial differences exist between the data sets, but they all collect essential
demographic and socioeconomic information. Hence, we know respondents’ educational
attainment, employment and earnings, partnership status, living arrangements, and some
family background details, such as parents’ education level. Exploiting data included in
these surveys, we compare individuals making the transition to adulthood in 1973, 1987,
and in 2007, respectively. Following this strategy we obtain three samples with an almost
identical age range (22–30 in the NLS and in the NLSY79, and 22–28 in NLSY97) but in
three very different historical contexts. The NLS includes people born in the last years of
World-War II and in the Post-war decade, so they can be considered baby boomers. This
was a time of substantial economic growth and prosperity. The NLSY79 cohorts (late
Baby Boom) were born in a period in which the U.S. economy was still growing and
expanding. However, by the time they reached adolescence and earlier adulthood, many
of the forces that contributed to the prolongation of adult transitions were underway.
Nonetheless, labor market prospects were still relatively good at the end of the 1980s,
after a severe recession earlier in the decade during which wage stagnation started and
income inequality rose. The NLSY97 cohorts were raised in a period of varying
prosperity and in an era when a two or four-year college education became increasingly
essential to enter the middle class.
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1973-Round of NLS, Round 9 of NLSY79, and Round 11 of NLSY97 (the focus
of this study) include fewer individuals than their respective first rounds owing to
attrition. Moreover, the NLSY79 contains a military sample (individuals born between
1957 and 1961 and serving in the military as of September 30, 1978) and a group of
oversampled economically disadvantaged whites. We exclude both these groups to make
the samples more comparable. After dropping these individuals (1,280 of the military
sample and 1,643 economic disadvantaged whites) and those with missing information on
essential variables, we are left with 6,888 individuals in the NLS (49.4 percent men and
50.6 percent women), 8,590 individuals in the NLSY79 (48.4 percent men and 51.6
percent women) and 7,418 respondents in the NLSY97 sample (51.4 percent men and
49.6 percent women).

3.3.2 Methods
!
In order to answer the first research question we start by describing the employment
situation of the young adults in the three samples. Secure, full-time employment is
defined, according to the conventional definition, as working more than 35 hours per
week and more than 40 weeks per year. The structure and main characteristics of the
samples are reported in Table 2.1.
We next compute the percentage of young adults who are able to live
independently and support themselves with their own earnings. To define the
affordability of living independently, we use the poverty thresholds established by the
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U.S. Census Bureau12 and consider economic self-sufficiency to include those who report
an income that is greater than 200 percent of the poverty threshold.13

Table 2.1 NLS (1973), NLSY79 (1987) and NLSY97 (2007) Sample Characteristics
1973
1987
2007
Mean Age
25.4
25.7
24.9
% Female
50.6%
51.6%
49.6%
% Enrolled in school
10.8%
8.5%
15.5%
% in a union
69.5%
50.0%
42.5%
% Married
62.7%
42.3%
23.6%
% Cohabiting
n/a
7.7%
18.9%
% with at least 1 child
56.3%
41.7%
34.1%
% living with parents
21.6%
24.4%
28.1%
% working "full-time"
51.7%
54.7%
51.8%
5.6**
7.0**
4.6**
Unemployment rate*
60.4**
65.2**
66.2**
Labor Force Participation Rate*
N

6888

8590

7418

*Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
**NB: we use information concerning the year preceding the survey
In addition, and still using Census Bureau poverty thresholds, we compute the percentage
of individuals who can support a family of three with their earnings (still considering as
able to support a family those earning more than 200 percent of the poverty threshold for
that family size). Poverty thresholds for years and family units considered in the analysis

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

The Census Bureau updates poverty thresholds each year. Values of the poverty thresholds for the years 1960–2008
for families of different sizes are available on the Census Bureau's website, and they differ by age (distinguishing
between families with members under and over age 65). Thresholds are the same for all mainland states, regardless of
regional differences in the cost of living, and are updated annually for price changes using the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
13
All the analyses presented in Sections 4 and 5 have been repeated using two alternative definitions of economic selfsufficiency. We used the simple poverty line (and not two times the poverty line) as a threshold, and a within-sample
threshold, specified as the average income of respondents in 1973, 1987 and 2007, respectively. Results with
alternative definitions of economic independence are similar to those presented here.
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are reported in Table 2.1.14 All the analyses described above are produced separately for
men and women in order to address the first part of the second research question, i.e. how
the trends in the transition to economic self-sufficiency differ by gender.

Table 2.2 Poverty Thresholds. Source: US Census Bureau
1972
1986
2006
1-person family unit (members age < 65)
$ 2,168
$ 5701
$ 10,488
3-persons family unit (members age < 65)
$ 3,339
$ 8,820
$ 16,227
NB: we use poverty thresholds of the year preceding the survey, because earnings are
referred to that year

The concept of economic self-sufficiency can be defined in several ways, such as being
able to live in a separate household, without any family members and without any
financial support from the family of origin. It can also be defined as the ability to
establish a partnership and have a child. In addition, the source of economic
independence is also relevant. It can be earnings from work, welfare and social transfers
in addition to wages, family income, or even loans. Young adults who decide to go to
college or graduate studies after that will achieve financial self-sufficiency at an older age
than those who do not go to college. However, investing in more education can pay off in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14

Our measure of financial self-sufficiency is only based on wages and self-employment income, and does not reflect
family support, taxes, or welfare transfers. However, reforms to the cash assistance program in 1996 substantially
altered access to cash assistance. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a more flexible block grant,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), attached work mandates and time limits to receipt of welfare. It is
impossible to accurately measure its impact with our data (and it is not feasible for the NLS), which can cause some
bias in our estimates. However, we computed the total amount of welfare transfers received by respondents in NLSY79
and NLSY97 samples. Hence, we have information about AFDC or TANF, food stamps benefits, unemployment
insurance, and Supplemental Security Income in 1986 and 2006. Exploiting this important information, we can add
welfare transfers to wages and perform the same kind of analysis implemented using labor earnings. Results including
welfare transfers are used as robustness checks, but the main trend and the differences between 1987 and 2007 do not
differ substantially from the analyses without welfare transfers.
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the long run and can lead to a more secure job and a higher standard of living.
Consequently it is unclear whether economic independence should be evaluated using
current income, if any, or the discounted flow of future earnings. Moreover, the current
amount of earnings together with expectations about career prospects can influence
decisions about standard of living (e.g., affordability of a marriage or of childbearing).
Individuals with low incomes in early adulthood may decide not to marry or have
children. Others who have higher earnings, or who can expect a substantial wage growth,
may feel more secure in deciding to having a greater number of children. In this case it is
hard to classify individuals as economically independent and to establish which one of
the two conditions implies greater economic self-sufficiency.
Furthermore, the meaning of self-sufficiency may have changed from 1970s to
2007. Both expectations about what it takes to live independently and the actual costs of
living have changed. The housing market conditions and child care services and costs
have undergone considerable transformations, as has the welfare system. All these
aspects contribute to shaping individuals’ attitudes and beliefs about their prospects and
strategies to achieve economic independence. Ideally, to answer our research questions,
it would be necessary to define economic independence taking into account all the issues
discussed above. Our measure should adapt to changes in the costs of living and also to
people’s expectations. Likewise, it would be necessary to follow people over time in their
transition to adulthood, to focus on life course trajectories and to investigate how
investments in higher education may delay the achievement of economic independence
but also improve the subsequent standard of living. However, the approach we take here
is somewhat limited by the nature of the data. We use panel data in a cross-sectional way.
71
!

!
!
We cannot exploit the longitudinal data to follow young adults over time, given that there
are only two waves of NLSY97 after Round 11, the one investigated here. This also
means that our measure of economic independence is built on current income, rather than
a life course approach. However, by just using the NLSY79 and NLS, we would lose
ability to compare the current situation with that in the 1980s and 1970s. Consequently,
even though our approach is incomplete and partial, it will shed light on the evolution of
young adults’ characteristics in the United States in the last 40 years and establish the
basis for future research when new waves of NLSY97 will be released.

Also, our examination takes account of the importance of social class variations over time
by computing the proportion economically independent and/or able to support a family
by parents’ education level. Parents’ education level 15 is based on three different
categories: we divided the distribution of parents’ education into terciles, in order to take
into account the fact that education expanded over time – not only for respondents, but
for parents as well. As a matter of fact, the threshold dividing the first and the second
terciles is “10 years of education” in 1973, “11 years of education” in 1987, and “12
years of education” in 2007. Also the threshold dividing the second and the third terciles
has changed over time, “12 years of education” in 1973 and 1987, and “14 years of
education” in 2007.
Finally, we implement an event history analysis – through some complementary
logistic regression models with random effects for individuals (Lancaster 1979; Nickell
1979) – to explore the possibility of a convergence in life course trajectories among men
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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We used the highest level of education between that of the father and that of the mother.
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and women, and to investigate the association between the parental social class and the
timing of economic self-sufficiency. We merge the three data sets and we include some
socio-demographic variables, such as age (as a time-varying covariate) and race, and then
we start including other explanatory variables step by step in order to answer our research
questions. First we include time dummies to see how the timing of economic
independence differs across cohorts, and a gender dummy to detect the distance between
men and women. Secondly, we include some interaction terms between the gender
dummy and the time dummies to test the hypothesis that there is some convergence over
time in the life course trajectories of males and females. Third, we incorporate the
covariates referring to family background – parents’ educational attainment and whether
the respondent was living with both biological parents at age 14 – to shed light on the
environment in which the respondent grew up, which may influence the transition to
economic independence. Many studies show the effects of parental education,
occupation, number of siblings, family income, and other characteristics of family
background on the timing of school completion, labor force entry, marriage, and
parenthood, and on their sequencing (Duncan, Featherman and Duncan 1972; Hogan and
Astone 1986; Marini 1978; Marini 1984a). Relatively disadvantaged family
circumstances or relatively low levels of resources have been linked to early exit from
school, early marriage and parenthood. Having relatively less educated parents, growing
up in a household with neither natural parent or with a stepparent, and having more
siblings are associated with lower per capita income, which can deter marriage. The
impact of family background on the timing of home-leaving is less clear cut. Last but not
least, we do interact parental education level with time dummies and also with gender to
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investigate whether and how the role of family social class has changed in the last four
decades, and if it has a different role for men and women.
The results do not establish causal relationships or uncover exact determinants of
economic independence, but the findings can still shed important light on young adults’
conditions in the United States.

3.4 Trends in financial independence over time
The first step is to compare the three groups of young adults on employment status and
economic independence. The mean age of working full-time is 25.6 in 1973, 25.9 in 1987
and 25 in 2007 (with a standard deviation of 2.5 in 1973, 2.2 in 1987 and 1.4 in 2007, and
median age equal to 25 in 1973, 26 in 1987, and 25 in 2007).16
Except for the NLS, all NLSY data sets over-sample Hispanics and blacks. Therefore, if
the data are not adjusted, the greater number of black and Hispanic respondents would
skew population averages toward black and Hispanic averages. For this reason, we
adjusted the data using population weights when computing the proportion of those who
are employed “full-time” and economically self-sufficient.
Figure 2.1 reports results for men and women relative to the trends in employment
status and economic independence, over time and by age. As expected, the percentage of
men working full-time increases with age for all the three groups. However, the
percentage of males who have a full-time job is highest in 1973, decreases in 1987, and it
is lowest in 2007. Moreover the differences sharpen with age, except for ages 25 and 26,
for which we observe very similar percentages in 1973 and 1987. If in 1973, by age 29!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Note that the age range is wider in 1973 and 1987 (22-30) than in 2007 (22-28).
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30 almost 90% of males in the sample are employed full-time, this proportion drops to
79% in 1987, and to 65% in 2007. This is a very clear signal of the worsening in the
situation of young males in the U.S. over time.
Our measure of income sufficiency shows a similar pattern. In this case, however,
the difference is apparent even at very young ages and does not decrease with age.
Interestingly, in all years – 1973, 1987 and 2007 – the percentage of individuals able to
live independently or afford to support a family is lower or at most equal than the
percentage working full-time. This suggests that even with a relatively stable job, some
young men are unable to earn enough to start their independent households. The distance
between these two figures (percentage working full-time and percentage economically
self-sufficient) is greatest for NLSY97 respondents. Hence financial independence is
lowest in 2007, and this is certainly true at individual level. It is worth mentioning that
this might not be the case at household level, given that men in the later cohorts who are
in a partnership have combined incomes with working women, or women are completely
supporting their spouses. The last graph in Figure 2.1 referred to young men shows the
proportion of respondents able to support a family of 3 people with their earnings. We
observe exactly the same pattern as for economic independence, possibly with even
larger differences in the three groups. In contrast to deteriorating economic circumstances
over time for men, women’s economic position does not erode (bottom part of Figure
2.1). Nor do we observe the same strong gradient by age in the percentage of women
working full-time.
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Figure 2.1 Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Were Working Full-Time and Who Had Attained
Economic Independence
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An increase with age is still evident for women in 1987 and in 2007, although in
the older age groups percentages are very similar, suggesting that there may be an upper
limit for the share working full-time (approximately 50-55 percent). Interestingly, if
percentages working full-time are very similar in 1987 and 2007, they are much lower in
1973. This shows the considerable increase in educational attainment and, certainly, in
female labor force participation rates. It can also depend on a rise in the labor force
participation of women with children or on the decline in fertility, or both.
As for economic independence, however, when we look at 1987 and 2007 the
results do not show significant differences with respect to men, except for the fact that
distance between the two samples decreases with age. The proportion of women who
report to be financially independent in 1973 lies in between that for the other two data
sets until age 24. From age 25 it is even lower than in 2007, showing once again the
improvements of women in the labor market. The pictures describe the progress of
women in the 1970s, until the late 1980s, but then show an adjustment that bring them
closer to the trend we observed for men. The share of economically independent women
is clearly much lower than for men, ranging between 33 percent and 50 percent in 1987,
and between 18 percent and 39 percent in 2007. The shares do, however, increase with
age and are higher in 1987 than in 2007 at all ages.
There is a good possibility that education plays a role postponing full-time work.
The level of education increased over time, and both men and women in 2007 were
enrolled in school longer than their counterparts 20 or 40 years earlier. Being a full-time
student normally prevents one from being a full-time worker and from being able to earn
enough to be independent. On the other hand, being more educated increases the
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likelihood of finding a secure job and earning a good wage. We replicated the analyses
shown in Figure 2.1 while excluding those who were still in school in all samples to
ensure that the different proportions of students did not bias the results. Results from
these analyses do not differ from those shown above.
The next step is to look at how the proportion of young men and women who
achieved financial independence differs by level of parents’ education. Results are
reported in Figure 2.217. Among men we observe an increase with age in the proportion
of those self-sufficient, and a monotonic decrease over time periods. Moreover, there is a
gradient by education level: the higher the parents’ education level, the less evident is the
postponement in achieving economic independence. The distance between the the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd terciles would have been much more pronounced if we were looking at
respondent’s education attainment (Figure 2.A2 in the Appendix). However, we can still
observe an increase from the 1st to the 2nd tercile. Surprisingly there is not such a big
difference between the 2nd and the 3rd terciles, as we expected to find a higher proportion
of men who achieved financial independence among those with parents in the third tercile
and it is not the case. One explanation can be that in the past the real difference was
between those with no education or just with primary education and those who attended
high school. An high school diploma most likely was enough for parents of respondents
interviewed in 1973 and in 1987 to find a good job, earn good wages and so to assure
their children a favorable family background and environment where to grow up. If this is
true in the past, not necessarily it is accurate to describe the picture in 2007. However, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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We also reproduce the analyses using the number of years from the end of education instead of age. This gives
information about the time young adult could spend in the labor market to build up enough income to become
economic self-sufficient. Results do not show significant differences (See Appendix).
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threshold between the 1st and the 2nd terciles in 2007 is “12 years of education”, meaning
that the difference between the 1st and the 2nd terciles is between those with college
educated parents and those with parents who did not attend college.
In this Figure we also show the graphs related to the ability of supporting a family
of three persons with wages. The proportion among men is clearly lower, for all periods
and for all age groups. Again the percentages increase with age and decrease over time.
In this case the distance between the different terciles is more visible, and the gradient of
the delay decreases when parents’ education increases. If we look at the two
corresponding graphs for women the picture is much more blurred. The proportion of
women who achieved economic self-sufficiency increased by age only in 2007,
independently on parents’ level of education, and in 1987 for women whose parents are
in the 3rd tercile of the distribution. Possibly, these graphs show how women are
becoming more similar over time in terms of employment and financial independence.
On the other hand, if among men we observed a decrease over time in the proportion
economically self-sufficient, among women there is an increase from 1973 to 1987, and
then just a small decrease in 2007. Moreover, we notice an improvement by parents’ level
of education, especially from the 1st to the 2nd tercile. The increase by parents’ education
is slightly less marked in 2007, meaning that probably trends in female labor force
participation are becoming less dependent on family background and parents’ education.
Finally, investigating the ability of women to support a family, we find a striking low
proportion that is able to do that among those whose parents are in the 1st tercile.
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Figure 2.2 Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Had Attained Economic Independence,
by age and parents’ education
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In addition, the upward trend in the ability to support a family by parents’ education is
more evident than that for financial independence itself.
The Figures presented above showed clear signals of delay and postponement in
the achievement of economic self-sufficiency, even with different degrees of intensity
and strength. Delay is more pronounced among men, and it is greater among those whose
parents are low educated. Generally speaking, however, if the downward trend is so
widespread and apparent, it is extremely important to investigate more deeply the
mechanisms behind it. This can be helpful to reduce the postponement by proposing labor
market strategies that support young adults to become self-sufficient at an earlier stage.
We return to this question in the conclusion of the paper.

3.5 Convergence between genders and the role of parental social class in the
timing of economic self-sufficiency?
As described in section 3.2, we implement an event history analysis – through some
complementary logistic regression models – in order to understand which factors are
associated with the timing of economic independence (our response variable takes the
value of 1 if the respondent is able to support him- or herself, and 0 otherwise). To do
that we use our data longitudinally, and build the event history for economic
independence to study when respondents became self-sufficient for the first time. Some
of them have never achieved independence, and are therefore censored. We describe the
results only in qualitative terms, reporting the results of the regression analysis in the
appendix (see Table 2.A1).
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As expected age and race are important predictors of self-sufficiency. As a matter
of fact being older increases the “risk” of achieving self-sufficiency, while this risk is
lower for “non-white” respondents. The analyses confirm what we reported in Figure 2.1,
and so that the probability of achieving financial independence is significantly lower for
women, and it is also lower in 2007 and 1987 than in 1973 showing the delay of this
event over time. But what we are interested in is the possibility of a convergence over
time in men and women life course trajectories, and the results reveal that the difference
in the timing of economic independence across gender is becoming smaller over time.
This is probably due to a strong delay among men and some progress among women,
who increase their participation in the labor force.
When we look at the role of family background we find that having parents with
high education slightly increases the probability of achieving independence. This means
that growing up in an “advantaged” family may have some beneficial effects in terms of
economic independence during the transition to adulthood. However the positive role of
parents’ socio-economic status seems to change over time, being strong and evident in
1987 but not in 1973 and in 2007. Also, the association between parental socioeconomic
status and the “risk” of becoming self-sufficient is different between men and women.
The beneficial effect that we may observe is stronger for women, suggesting that being
from an advantaged family makes it easier to achieve economic independence for a
woman than for a man – who is probably better off in terms of employment and earnings
independently on the conditions of the family of origin.
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A potential limitation should be noted. We do not have information on other key
explanatory variables that could potentially shed light on why it is so difficult to achieve
economic independence and why it became more difficult in the last four decades (e.g.,
family income, if respondents own the house they live in, etc.).

3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The transition to adulthood has changed considerably between the 1970s and late 2000s
in the United States. It is much more difficult for young adults to achieve economic
independence in 2007 than it was 35 years before. A sizable difference exists between
1973, 1987 and 2007 in the percentages of young people able to live independently or to
support a family of three people with their own earnings. The picture is to some extent
different for men and women. Among young men, the differences grow with age,
suggesting that postponement of economic independence is considerable and that over a
six-year time span we do not observe any catch up. Among women, we observe an
increase over time in the proportion working full-time, due mainly to a substantial
expansion of education and an increase in the female labor force participation.
Nonetheless there are signs of convergence over time in the situation of men and women
concerning the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.
While the postponement of economic independence over the past four decades is
clear, the potential implications of the delay for family formation have not been examined
directly in this paper. Men’s lower proportion working full-time and their later economic
self-sufficiency may have a “negative” impact on the timing of marriage (or cohabitation)
83
!

!
!
and parenthood, transferring the delay also on these events (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001;
Blossfeld et al. 2005; Gibson-Davis 2009). The positive results obtained by women do
not necessarily counterbalance the effects of men’s delay of economic self-sufficiency in
family formation (Harknett and Kuperberg 2009; Sweeney 2002). As a matter of fact, an
increase in the proportion of women working full-time and able to support themselves
may not translate into incentives for marriage and motherhood – as it might happen for
men. It certainly depends on which one between the independence and the income effect
prevails, not to mention the role of institutions and welfare state.
Education surely plays an important role in achieving economic independence,
and the higher the educational attainment, the less likely it is that an individual will live
in poverty. Staying in school for a longer time, however, is one possible reason for the
delayed entry into the labor force. Hence, if education plays a role because it expanded
and more people spend more years in school starting later the transition to adulthood,
then it is easier to recuperate for those with a college degree.
In the second part of the analysis we have also investigated the role of family
background, how it influences the transition to economic independence, how its role has
changed over time, and its different impact on men and women. We argue that it is
essential to take socioeconomic background into account when trying to interpret the
delay in the achievement of financial independence, on top of possible structural changes
and possible normative shifts. We found that it has a positive, even if rather small,
association with the probability of becoming self-sufficient, and that this association is
stronger in 1987 than in 1973 or 2007, and it is stronger among women than among men.
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The debate about which one between structural changes in the U.S. economy and
labor market, and normative shifts concerning youth’s attitudes is still open, and it should
be an important topic for future research. In all likelihood these forces are both in place
and shape young adults’ lives and choices. Their expectations, of course, are not
completely independent of the awareness of tougher labor market conditions. At the same
time, it is possible that many couples retain preferences in the ideal situation for earlier
family formation if economic conditions permitted. However, the early patterns of family
formation characteristic of the post-war period were probably not sustainable in an era of
a slower growing economic and an increasing demand for higher skills in the labor
market. So we suspect that norms have changed, but we also consider it likely that the
normative change reflects the new realities facing young adults from the conditions that
their parents experienced in the 1980s and their grandparents in the 1960s.
One of the advances of many developed societies is that they developed mechanisms that
allow young adults to do "other things" rather than starting work or a family relatively
early. Education is clearly one example of this, which is in part financed by transfers
(private and government), loans, and high returns to education. One possible question is
whether the young adults who are in higher education today would rather be on a career
track as their parents were in their early to mid-20s. In this perspective, the delay could
be seen as a response to the opportunities offered to them. To better understand what is
happening, future works should look directly at people’s attitudes towards employment
and what it takes to be self-sufficient, and also should investigate the effect of policies
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aimed at changing the structure of the labor market. Also we need to focus our attention
on the possible implications of the delay for the formation of the family, and on how
changes in the timing of the first steps in the transition to adulthood may affect timing of
other events – i.e. forming a co-residential union and having a child – later in life. But
that is the topic of a future paper.

86
!

!
!

3.7 Appendix
Figure 2.A1 Men and Women Who Had Attained Economic Independence, by years from the end of education and parents’ education
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Figure 2.A2 Share of Men and Women in 1973, 1987 and 2007 Who Had Attained
Economic Independence, by age and level of education
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Table 2.A118.
Complementary Logistic Regression, Y = 1 if able to support themselves with earnings, 0
otherwise.
Number of observations: 22,896. 1973: N = 6,888. 1987: N = 8,590. 2007: N = 7,418
Odds ratios

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Age

1.359***

1.359***

1.373***

1.374***

1.374***

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.006]

Race: non-white

0.633***

0.634***

0.686***

0.694***

0.691***

[0.014]

[0.014]

[0.017]

[0.018]

[0.017]

Female

0.376***

0.166***

0.190***

0.188***

0.147***

[0.008]

[0.007]

[0.009]

[0.009]

[0.008]

t: 1987

0.559***

0.359***

0.380***

0.286***

0.291***

[0.015]

[0.013]

[0.015]

[0.016]

[0.016]

0.972

0.515***

0.537***

0.503***

0.529***

!
t: 2007

!

[0.026]

1987*Female

!
2007*Female

!

[0.018]

[0.022]

[0.029]

[0.031]

2.619***

2.264***

2.291***

2.235***

[0.138]

[0.132]

[0.133]

[0.130]

4.005***

3.467***

3.492***

3.201***

[0.214]

[0.204]

[0.205]

[0.190]

1.135***

1.121***

1.122***

[0.030]

[0.030]

[0.030]

Father Education ≥ 12 yrs

1.049

0.915

0.829**

[0.027]

[0.049]

[0.047]

Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs

1.178***

1.041

0.928

[0.032]

[0.056]

[0.053]

1987*Father Education ≥ 12 yrs

1.269***

1.259***

[0.086]

[0.085]

1987*Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs

1.328***

1.317***

[0.090]

[0.089]

1.13

1.12

[0.076]

[0.075]

1.03

1.019

[0.071]

[0.070]

Live with parents when 14

2007*Father Education ≥ 12 yrs
2007*Mother Education ≥ 12 yrs
Female*Father Education

1.259***

Female*Mother Education

1.302***

[0.064]
[0.069]
Standard errors in brackets. P-values: p ≤ 0.10:*, p ≤ 0.05:**, p ≤ 0.01:***
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As for the analyses presented in Figure 2.1, we replicated the analyses in Table 2.A1 excluding respondents who
are still in education, not to produce biased results due to the expansion of education over time. Results do not
show significant changes. We do not show the results of the models concerning the ability to support a family,
given the similarity with those in Table 2.A1. However, they are available upon request.
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4. Chapter 3: “The Role of Parental Social Class in the Transition to
Adulthood: a Sequence Analysis Approach in Italy and the United
States”.19
4.1 Introduction
!
In the last fifty years the process that brings adolescents and teenagers to adulthood
has changed greatly, in many – if not all – countries in the West developed world.
After World War II adult roles, such as being employed full-time and financially
independent were achieved by the early 20s. Nowadays it takes much longer to
assume such roles, and the whole transition has been postponed to the late 20s, early
30s. The general delay that has been found in the first steps of the transition to
adulthood (Sironi and Furstenberg 2012) is most likely transferred also to the
subsequent events in life trajectories, such as leaving the parental home, starting a coresidential union, and having children. As a result, in developed societies young
adults, as compared to older cohorts, experience a delay in the transition to adulthood
(Aassve et al. 2002b; Furstenberg 2010; Settersten, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2006).
However, the patterns leading to adulthood are not simply postponed. Because of
profound structural and cultural changes that occurred in the western world in the last
few decades, life trajectories had to adapt and have become more diverse. The
“second demographic transition” theory would use the word individualization to
characterize changes in the life course (Lesthaeghe 1995; Van de Kaa 1987). But as
Elzinga and Liefbroer (Elzinga and Liefbroer 2007) pointed out, this term includes
many different aspects, such as the de-institutionalization, the de-standardization, and
the differentiation in the life trajectories of young adults. This means that, first, the
order of events become less clear and less guided by normative rules of the society.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This chapter is co-authored by Nicola Barban (University of Groningen, NL) and Roberto Impicciatore
(Università di Milano, IT).
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Second, it means that the timing at which the events occur may vary substantially
between individuals, as well as the duration in different states. Finally it means that
the “number of distinct stages that young adults occupy increases” (Bruckner and
Mayer 2005).
Within the framework of postponement and individualization of trajectories
shaping the life course, timing and sequencing of events in the patterns of transition to
adulthood are still strongly influenced by family background (Elzinga and Liefbroer
2007; Ravanera, Rajulton and Burch 2006). The exact mechanisms by which socioeconomic status affects the transition to adulthood and the ability to achieve economic
self-sufficiency are largely unknown, but presumably include factors such as role
modeling, labor market connections, neighborhood influences and parents’ ability to
make monetary investments in their children.
The aim of this study is to investigate the role of parental social status on the
sequence of events characterizing the transition to adulthood, i.e. school completion,
entry into the labor market, leaving the parental home, entry into a co-residential
union, and parenthood. All of these events mutually influence each other in terms of
timing resulting in major challenges in lifestyles, responsibilities, and autonomy
(Gauthier and Furstenberg 2002). Thus, focusing on single events makes it difficult to
understand the interrelationships of these different steps. We address this issue by
implementing a sequence analysis, an approach that gives a “holistic” perspective and
in which life course is seen as one meaningful conceptual unit (Billari 2001).
Moreover, we compare two different countries – the United States and Italy – in order
to understand if and how the institutional structure and context can fill the gap
stemming from disadvantaged family background. Indeed, U.S. and Italy are located
in different stages along the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de
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Kaa 1986) showing a different incidence of “individualized” and “secularized”
behaviours such as informal cohabitations, non-marital fertility and marital
dissolution.

4. 2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
!
The Second Demographic Transition Theory predicts a general trend toward
heterogeneous experiences in individual life courses. Changes in the economic
structure and cultural shifts trigger individualization in the demographic behavior,
which implies flexibility in life trajectories and longer periods spent in states such as
single person or unmarried cohabitation. Furthermore, these trends have been
complicated by short-term economic fluctuation and historical events. Hence, we
would expect all countries to converge in their demographic behavior and so more
homogeneity in national experiences, but more diverse sequence patterns, with
familial and non-familial transition markers increasingly overlapping (Shanahan,
2000). However, we still observe great heterogeneity across countries, and this is
mainly due to the fact that countries can be found in different stages of the transition
process. Italy and the U.S. can be considered as probably the main example of
countries at a different stage of the transition, with the U.S. being the leader and Italy
being the lagger. Consequently, the role of parental social class in the transition to
adulthood might be different in such different contexts, and the differences across
countries might become smaller as social class increases.
As suggested by Furstenberg (2008), the relevance of family social class on
the subsequent life course starts before birth, it continues throughout adolescence, and
it is able to shape the course of young adult transitions and psychological
development in the third and fourth decades of life. Youth from affluent and well92
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educated families marry and have children later in life because of a longer education,
much more extended search for a permanent partner in life, and a lower incidence of
unintended pregnancy (Furstenberg 2008). In other words, the family background is
crucial in determining the individual resources that may lead to good decisions in the
early phases of adulthood. These resources may be economic and cultural. Financial
resources may create or facilitate opportunities for a longer education and a delayed
entry into the labor market. As a matter of fact, young adults from disadvantaged
families, even if they go to college, do it with fewer resources and therefore face more
difficulties in completing the degree. Moreover they do not want and cannot afford to
remain unemployed for too long, and consider education as a way to get a job. So
they are more likely to drop out of school if they are able to find an occupation.
Finally, the economic difficulties linked to the housing costs, may hinder the
independent living before family formation. As far as cultural resources are
concerned, Kohn et al (1986) noticed that in raising their children middle class
parents tend to give more importance to autonomy whereas working class parents are
more focused on conformity (Kohn, Slomczynski and Schoenbach 1986). Upper-class
parents tend to talk to their children more than working-class parents do. Therefore,
favouring analytical thinking, higher status parents prepare their children for higher

education and higher status jobs (Nisbett 2009). However, there are other authors who
posit that the association between parents’ socioeconomic status and young adult
outcomes may also reflect the intergenerational transmission of genetic traits such as
intelligence or motivation (Guldi, Page and Stevens 2007).
Focusing on the effect of parental resources on leaving the parental home – a
crucial step in the transition to adulthood – De Jong-Gierveld et al (1991) distinguish
four classes of parental resources, material and non-material, and that can or cannot
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be transferred to young adults. The transferable material resources are strictly related
to income; the transferable non-material resources refer to parents’ education, cultural
and social capital, i.e. a set of values that are transmitted to the children via
socialization process; the non-transferable material resources are related to the
available space within the parental home (inversely related to the number of siblings)
and to the mother’s role in taking care of home chores, preparing meals, washing, and
cleaning; the non-transferable non-material parental resources refer to the quality of
relationships among family members. Each kind of resource may play a specific role
in the decision of leaving the parental home and, consequently in the transition to
adulthood. Results for young adults born in Netherlands show that autonomy and
independence are strengthened by high level of transferable parental resources and
weakened by high level of non-transferable resources (De Jong-Gierveld, Liefbroer
and Beekink 1991).
In any case, family background can influence not only the timing of events in
the transition to adulthood but also the sequencing of these events thus modifying the
propensity to experience traditional or innovative patterns. For example, it has been
underlined that children from higher family social status on the one hand tend to
postpone their first union (Wiik 2009) and their first child birth (Rijken and Liefbroer
2009); on the other hand, tend to acquire their housing autonomy earlier, without
directly making the transition to live with a partner (Blaauboer and Mulder 2010). A
specific interest may be also devoted to the order of events related to family formation
(first union, first marriage, first child) identifying innovative patterns such as
cohabitation, pre-marital pregnancies, childbirth out-of-wedlock.
The effect of familial status on the propensity to experience more complex or
innovative pattern of transition to adulthood may be context-specific. The
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classification and the characteristics of the different welfare states suggest that the destandardization, turbulence and individualization in life course trajectories are more
advanced in countries that can be classified as liberal or social-democratic compared
to the southern European countries, where welfare support is very weak and we
observe a reliance on the family as the locus of support (Ferrera 1996; Mayer 2001;
Trifiletti 1999). In our analysis we focus on North America and Southern Europe
since the existing literature suggest crucial differences between them. Several studies
show that in North America, an higher familial status tends to decrease the
complexity of trajectories or, in other words, to push towards a more “traditional”
pattern, i.e. a trajectory in which the end of education and the first job precedes union
formation, which in turn precedes parenthood (Hogan 1981; Hogan and Astone 1986;
Marini 1984a; Marini 1984b). In Canadian society, completing postsecondary
education and getting a job are important steps to marriage and parenthood in
particular among high and middle social classes (Rajulton and Burch 2010; Rajulton,
Ravanera and Beaujot 2007; Ravanera, Rajulton and Burch 2003; Ravanera, Rajulton
and Burch 2006). Youth born and raised in high socio-economic conditions, on
average, take longer to find a permanent partner (and to have children). They are not
less likely to cohabit, but their cohabitation (or their marriage) ends up to be much
more stable than co-residential unions of young adults coming from low-educated
families. For disadvantaged young men and women cohabitation may be the result of
unintended pregnancy, and so it can result in greater family instability later in life
(Furstenberg 2008).
In Southern Europe, and Italy in particular, in a context characterized by an
higher persistence of “traditional” sequencing of events (also due to the still strong
influence of the Catholic Church), innovative and more complex patterns, mainly
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living alone, non-marital cohabitation and children out-of-wedlock, are more
widespread among children of upper social classes. Thus, the “burgeois” model is
characterized by the postponement of events and the non-linear nature of the pattern
leading to the adulthood, whereas lower class young people would continue to follow
traditional and safer trajectories as a protection against the uncertain economic
situation (Cavalli, Buzzi and De Lillo 1997; Galland 1995; Galland 1997).
Finally, the role of parental background may be different across gender in
specific context. Usually women face the transition to family formation earlier than
men (mainly marriage and parenthood), although this trend is reducing over time due
to the expansion of female education together with the increase in the female labour
force participation. However, big differences still remain between countries. This is
the case of U.S. and Italy: 46% of female employment rate in Italy in 2011 versus
62% in the U.S. (OECD 2012). Thus, we wonder whether in a society characterized
by a high female unemployment rate and traditional gender roles within the couple
(woman caretaker and man breadwinner) like Italy, the effect of parental resources
may be different in shaping the transition to adulthood of daughters and sons.
Generally speaking, current literature, for the most part, focuses on single
events in a single context. The aim of our analysis is threefold. First, we want to
evaluate the impact of social origins on the patterns of transition to adulthood as a
whole; second, we apply a cross-national comparative perspective to evaluate the role
of a specific context in the relationship between parental social class and the transition
to adulthood; third we want to focus on gender differences and in particular we want
to evaluate if the role of parental background is gender-specific in the two counties.
Background literature enables us to formulate the following hypotheses, to be tested
separately for men and women:
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H1: a higher parental socio-economic status (in terms of parents’ education
and/or better occupation) is associated with a general postponement in the transition
to adulthood;
H2: patterns towards independence and family formation are more rapid, more
innovative and less standardized in the U.S. than in Italy;
H3: the effect of parental background on the life course trajectories is context
specific. In particular we expect that in the U.S. children of upper social status tend to
follow more normative and standardized sequence of states than children of lower
states whereas the opposite occurs in Italy.

4.3 Data and Methods
!
In this paper we use two different data sets, one for each country, containing similar
information on the life course of young adults. For the United States we use data
collected through the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79). The sample
includes 8,636 individuals (4,275 males and 4,361 females), born between 1957 and
1964, interviewed each year from 1979 to 1994, and every other year since 1994. We
consider waves from 1979 to 1996, in order to follow young adults starting when they
are 14-22 years old (born between 1957 and 1964) until they are 31-39 in 1996. The
NLSY79 collects information on a nationally representative sample of young men and
women, designed to gather information at multiple points in time on their labor
market activities and other significant life events. For Italy instead we use the
Multipurpose ISTAT survey called “Famiglia e soggetti sociali”, including
individuals born between 1899 and 1985 and interviewed at the end of 2003. We do
not use the entire sample, but we select the same birth cohorts included in the
NLSY79 to make the samples more homogeneous and comparable. Our final sample
for Italy includes 6,002 individuals (2,916 males and 3,086 females). The longitudinal
structure of the NLSY79 and the retrospective questions in the Multipurpose ISTAT
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survey enable us to reconstruct the steps, year by year, in the independence and
family transitions for each individual in the sample.

The method we intend to use to investigate the relationship between the social class
and the life course trajectories is based on the sequence analysis (Abbott 1995; Abbott
and Tsay 2000; Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010). We adopt a life course perspective,
looking at the entire development of school, employment, and family history. Parental
social status strongly affects the environment in which individuals grow up, and so
can have a large association with young adults’ life trajectories and the sequence of
events in their transition to adulthood. Individuals build their future on the basis of the
constraints and opportunities they have faced in the past (Elder 1994). The process is
iterative and cumulative, so it is important to take a unitary, holistic approach and
look at the effect of family background on the whole life course rather than on single
events of the transition to adulthood (Barban 2011; Barban and Billari 2012; Billari
2005).
The events we take into account are the following: end of education, entry into
labor force, leaving the parental home, first union (marriage and/or cohabitation), and
parenthood. Parents’ social status is defined on the basis of education level when the
respondent was 14 years old. More specifically parental socioeconomic status can be
low, medium or high depending on the level of parents’ education. Given the disparity
in the distribution of education level between Italy and the United States, we define a
low socioeconomic status in Italy if both parents attained just primary education, a
medium level if at least one attained lower secondary education, and a high level if at
least one attained upper secondary education. In the United States a low level
corresponds to both parents with primary or lower secondary education (9 or fewer
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years of education), a medium level corresponds to at least one parent with upper
secondary education (12 or fewer years of education), and a high level corresponds to
at least one parent with tertiary education (more than 12 years of school)20.
In sequence analysis each life course trajectory is represented by a string of
characters, resembling the one used to code DNA molecules in biological sciences.
Hence, every trajectory is made up of a number of values that corresponds to the
number of years each individual is observed. Accordingly, the number of possible
combinations is equal to (# possible different states)(#

years each individual is observed)

.

Moreover a sequence can differ along three dimensions:
- Timing, i.e. the age at which different events occur in peoples lives;
- Quantum, i.e. the number of events in a trajectory;
- Sequencing, i.e. the order in which different transitions happen.
We describe trajectories along these dimensions. In fact we investigate the median
age at each event (timing), we look at the proportion of individuals who experienced
each event by age 35 (quantum), and finally we report the frequencies of the five most
common independence and family trajectories showing the sequence of events
(sequencing). All these dimensions are explored by gender and parental social class.
After defining the different sequences and describing them in terms of timing,
quantum, and sequencing, we exploit a sequence analysis to identify specific
typologies of life trajectories – dealing simultaneously with timing, quantum, and
sequencing – in order to study how social class is related to the likelihood of ending
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20

We also used another measure of parental social class, using parents’ occupation instead of education level. We
consider the father’s job unless mother’s job is at higher level, or father’s job is missing and mother’s job is not
missing Erickson, Frederick. 1984. "School Literacy, Reasoning, and Civility: An Anthropologist's Perspective."
Review of Educational Research 54(4):525-46.. Also in this case we have three different levels of social class, low
(e.g. workers and farm laborers), medium (e.g. clericals, craftsmen, military soldiers), and high (e.g. professionals,
managers, entrepreneurs), based on the type of occupation that parents had when the respondent was 14. Results
do not change significantly when using occupation, and are more consistent with education. Education defines
more clearly socioeconomic status, hence we only report results obtained with education level in the sequence
analysis.
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up in a certain typology. The analytical strategy adopted in this case uses the Longest
Common Subsequences metric (LCS) proposed by Elzinga (Elzinga 2010), whose
goal is to compute a matrix of dissimilarities between pairs of sequences, and so of
life courses (Billari 2005). The dissimilarity measure is based on the length of
common distinct subsequences between life course trajectories. This metrics differs
from the Optimal Matching Algorithm of Abbott since it does not require a cost
definition and can be used with sequences of different length.
To take into account multiple domains, we adopted a multichannel sequence analysis
approach (Pollock 2007), that allows to specify multiple domains in order to
construct a single matrix of dissimilarities. In the multichannel sequence analysis, we
distinguish between transitions in the family domain (i.e., marriage, cohabitation and
childbearing) and transitions in the independence domain (i.e., school, leaving
parental home and entering the labor market). Once the dissimilarity matrix is built,
one possibility to identify a limited number of typologies is to apply a cluster analysis
(Aassve, Billari and Piccarreta 2007). Finally, we perform a multinomial logistic
regression analysis to investigate the relationship between parents’ socio-economic
status and the probability of being part of a specific typology (determined through the
cluster analysis).
As a robustness check, on top of the sequence and the cluster analysis we also
perform a latent class analysis to investigate whether the number of clusters selected
(i.e. five clusters) is a plausible one. We indeed find that the choice of five clusters is
correct, and that the characteristics of the clusters are very similar using the two
methods. Consequently we only report the results concerning the sequence and the
cluster analysis, while the findings of the latent class analysis are included in the
Appendix.
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One aspect that is worth mentioning is how gender can affect all the analyses
that will be developed in the article. Certainly the gender of individuals, together with
their social class, plays a fundamental role in the way people structure their transition
to adulthood. Usually women face the transition to family formation earlier than men
(mainly marriage and parenthood), even if this trend is reducing over time due to the
expansion of education which is greater among women, together with the increase in
the female labor force participation. Also, retrospective information on parenthood is
sometimes more reliable if asked to mothers rather than fathers, and sometimes
fertility questions are collected only among women. Given these differences we need
to adopt an analytical strategy that takes them into account, i.e. we do the analyses
separately for men and women.

4.4 Descriptive findings
!
4.4.1 Timing
!
Looking at Table 3.1, containing the median age of each event we consider in the
analysis, by country, gender, and by parental social class, the delay in the transition to
adulthood among Italian people is evident compared to the U.S. With the exception of
the median age at completing school, that is higher in the US because of the higher
schooling rates in this country, all the other events in the independence and family
transitions occur at an older age in Italy. For example, young adults leave the parental
home 3-4 years later in Italy than in the US (at age 27 for men vs. age 23, and at age
24/25 for women vs. age 21/22). Accordingly, cohabitation, marriage and parenthood
are postponed by 3-4 years. The median age at childbearing is well above 30 among
Italian men.
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When we look at the same figures but considering differences in parental
socioeconomic status, we find that among men in Italy the median age at each event
goes up as social class increases, meaning that coming from an advantaged family
background induces a delay in the transition. Also in the U.S. this is true, but the
gradient is weaker and not observable for “Starting a job” – the median age is
constant at 19 –, and for “leaving the parental home” – the median age is lower (23)
among those with a lower parental status than among those from a higher social class
(24). The same result can be observed among women. Median age at all the events is
generally lower than for men, but differences across countries and parental social
class persist.

Table 3.1. Median age at each event, by gender, country and parental social class
Weighted Median Age at…
Leaving
Starting a
Marriage
Home
Cohabitation
U.S. Italy U.S. Italy U.S. Italy

Completing
Education
U.S. Italy

Starting
1st Job
U.S. Italy

Low

18.6

14.9

19.0

19.0

24.0

Men
26.0 24.3

27.4

24.8

Medium

19.0

18.8

19.0

20.8

23.0

27.0

25.0

28.6

High
Parents’ social
class

23.0

19.8

19.0

24.2

23.0

27.7

26.0

30.4

Low

18.5

14.6

20.0

20.9

21.0

22.7

22.5

Medium

19.0

18.7

19.0

22.0

21.0

24.0

23.0

High

22.0

19.6

19.0

24.7

22.0

25.2

24.0

Parents’ social
class

Parenthood
U.S.

Italy

27.7

25.1

30.8

25.3

29.1

28.1

33.4

27.3

31.7

31.0

35.6

23.1

21.9

23.3

21.9

25.8

24.7

22.5

24.9

24.3

28.8

26.9

24.7

27.3

29.3

31.8

Women

Briefly, two major results emerge: firstly, a delay in the transition to adulthood
in Italy compared to the U.S.; secondly, differences across social class are stronger
among Italian young adults than among Americans. These results are confirmed by
looking at survival curves (see figure 3.A1 and 3.A2 in Appendix). This is a first
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signal that family background may be more important in some contexts (i.e. Italy)
than in others.

4.4.2 Quantum
!
Table 3.2 contains the proportion of people who have experienced each event by age
35 according to gender, country and parental social status. Generally speaking,
percentages tend to be higher in the U.S. showing that in this country the pattern to
adulthood is more likely to be completed by age 35 compared to Italy (Table 3.2).
Focusing on the acquisition of independence, we see in Italy a stronger gender gap for
“Starting a job” (only 75.2% of Italian women enter the job market by age 35
compared to 95.6% for men whereas in the U.S. the proportion are respectively 97.9%
and 98.7%) and an higher proportion of men that still live with their parents by age 35
(15.7% compared to 10.6% in the U.S.). For the events just mentioned, the gradient
across social class is not very strong, except for leaving home among American men
(92.7% in high SES vs. 84.3% in low SES), and for starting first job among Italian
women, of which only 71.4% enter the job market if they come from a lower social
class, while 89.8% start working by age 35 if from a higher social class.
Family transition, instead, shows big differences both across countries and
across social classes. As a matter of fact, in Italy men and women who experience
cohabitation are, respectively, at most 11.1% and 13.9% among higher class and
percentages considerably decrease among medium and low social classes. In the U.S.,
these proportions are around 35% and do not vary by social class and gender.
Interesting and contrasting characteristics in the two countries emerge for marriage:
the proportion of people married by age 35 in the US tends to increase among higher
social classes, while the opposite trend is observed in Italy. Moreover, differences
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between classes are stronger in Italy where the proportion of married by age 35 drops
from 77.8% to 67% for men and from 87.1% to 75.9% for women going from higher
to lower social class. It is possible that for these individuals marriage is substituted by
cohabitation, or it is delayed.
Finally, people experiencing parenthood are more widespread in the US than in Italy
(as expected by the lower TFR in Italy). In this case though the trend is decreasing in
both countries as social class goes up, possibly due to a delay in all the events
preceding childbearing that lead to a postponement of parenthood as well.
Table 3.2. Proportion of people who experienced each event within age 35, by
gender, country and parental social class

Completing
Education

Weighted Proportion of People Experiencing the Event
Starting
Leaving Parental
Starting a
Marriage
1st Job
Home
Cohabitation

Parenthood

U.S.

Italy

U.S.

Italy

U.S.

Italy

U.S.

Italy

U.S.

Italy

U.S.

Italy

Low

99.2

96.3

97.7

95.8

84.3

Men
84.5
35.3

3.7

78.3

77.8

76.5

67.7

Medium

97.3

98.8

98.9

96.0

88.7

82.6

35.7

7.1

82.1

73.2

73.2

57.1

High

95.3

98.0

99.1

94.2

92.7

85.0

34.7

11.1

81.3

67.0

67.5

49.4

Total
Parents’ social
class

96.9

97.0

98.7

95.6

89.4

84.3

35.2

5.4

81.1

75.3

71.8

63.3

Low

96.3

96.8

95.2

71.4

91.9

91.7

33.7

7.4

83.8

87.1

88.3

82.6

Medium

94.9

96.9

98.0

78.9

93.1

92.5

36.0

9.7

87.6

85.7

82.5

71.5

High

94.0

96.8

99.2

89.8

94.5

92.1

35.9

13.9

87.2

75.9

74.3

62.2

Total

94.8

96.7

97.9

75.2

93.5

92.1

35.8

8.7

86.7

85.2

80.7

77.3

Parents’ social
class

Women

In conclusion, relevant differences between US and Italy in the transition to adulthood
are confirmed looking at the quantum. These differences mainly concern the role of
women in the job market that is less widespread in Italy, and the events of family
transition. Again we observe that differences across social class are stronger in Italy
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than in the US, and that in some cases the gradient is different (as for cohabitation) or
even goes in opposite directions (as for marriage).
4.4.3 Order of events
!
Figure 3.1 shows the first five most common sequences of states in the independence
and family transition according to sex, parents’ level of education and country. In the
pattern towards independence, in both countries and for both sexes the exit from
parental home follows the end of education and the entry into the labour market (see
Figure 3.1a. and Figure 3.1b.). However, if in the US starting a job before the
completion of education is very common, it is almost non-existent in Italy, where end
of education is strongly characterized as first step in the transition to adulthood. The
effect of social class is more relevant among women than men. In particular, among
the former group, the more frequent sequence (in Italy: exit education, starting a job,
leaving home; in the U.S.: starting a job, exit education, leaving home) tends to be
reinforced within the higher SES (Figure 3.1b). Moreover, leaving home without a job
is very frequent in Italy, especially among lower classes, while it is almost nonexistent in the U.S.
Looking at family formation pattern (Figure 3.1c and Figure 3.1d), we see a
strong concentration of individual in Italy in the “traditional” sequence SingleMarried-Married Parent, especially among women. In the US, this sequence is the
more common as well but a higher heterogeneity of patterns emerges. For example, in
the American country, it tends to be more common living as a single outside the
parental home whereas in Italy people leave parental home to marry.
Once again, the role of family status is more important for women than for men, with
a declining frequency of “traditional” pattern among higher classes in both countries.
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Figure 3.1. Frequency of the 5 most common sequences of events in Independence and Family Transitions. By parents’ level of education.

a.

b.

c.

d.

Legend: 0 = still in school, without a job, living with parents; E = out of education; J = working; JE = out of school and working; LE = left parental home, out of school, but without a job; LJE
= left parental home, out of school and working. S = single; M = married; SL = single and left parental home; MP = married and parent;
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Briefly, Italy is more characterized by traditional patterns whereas in the US
people tend to experience a more various set of trajectories. In both countries social class
is relevant only for women showing a negative relation between family status and
percentage of people experiencing the more frequent sequence (Single-MarriedMarriedParent). However, looking at the independence pattern, we see that in Italy a
higher social class put more relevance to the end education as a first step in the transition
to adulthood whereas in the U.S. a higher status favors the beginning of the first job
before the end of education.
4.4.4. Summary
!
Summarizing, descriptive findings show that the transition to adulthood occurs much
later in Italy, independently by social class. However, social class – measured by parents’
level of education – emerges as a relevant aspect in shaping the patterns to adulthood and
sometimes its effect in the two countries is different (e.g. timing of first job, quantum of
cohabitations, incidence of “single living”) or goes in the opposite directions (quantum of
marriages, order between end of education and first job). In any case, from any
perspective, timing, quantum and sequence of events, the relevance of socio-economic
status emerges clearly stronger in Italy than in the US, in particular among women.

4.5 Holistic Perspective on the Transition to Adulthood
We now want to assume a more comprehensive perspective taking into account at the
same time all the three aspects we have seen separately in the previous section: timing,
quantum, and order of events. In order to facilitate the interpretation, we will show on
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separate graphs the process called “Independence” (characterized by the following states:
being a student, having entered the labor market, living with parents) and the process
called “Family formation” (characterized by the states: living with parents, single or
cohabiting or married, having a child), estimated simultaneously considering multiple
domains.
The first step considers the descriptive analysis of the distribution of states according to
the various ages (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) in order to highlight general differences between
the two countries in the transition to adulthood. In a second step, we will come back on
the effect of parents’ background on the transition to adulthood in US and Italy following
the research strategy called Sequence Analysis that starts with the identification of typical
patterns (in terms of sequence of states and time experienced in each state) through a
cluster analysis and then try to evaluate the propensity to follow a specific pattern
according to a specific population subgroup. More specifically, we pool the data for Italy
and the U.S. (but separately by gender) and through a sequence analysis we identify five
different typologies that show different behaviors in experiencing the events
characterizing the Independence and Family formation trajectories.

4.5.1 Description of the Process in the two Countries
!
As we can see in Figure 3.2, among men there exist substantial differences in the way
they face both the independence and the family transitions. First of all, looking at the top
of the figure, in Italy many young adults go through a phase in which they still live with
parents, are not in school and do not work. This category is almost non-existent in the
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U.S., where young men find their first job when they are still in school. Moreover men
who completed education and found a job are more likely to still live with parents in Italy
than in the U.S., and this is true also if they are still in school. As a matter of fact many
people in the U.S leave the parental home when they go to college, no matter how far the
college is from their parents’ house. When we look at family transition (bottom part of
the figure) we can see that cohabitation is very infrequent in Italy, while in the U.S. it is
limited but does happen among young men. Also, some statuses like being a single parent
do not exist in Italy, and living as a single out from parental home is more common in the
U.S. than in Italy. Based on Figure 3.2 we can argue that the transition to independence
occurs earlier in the U.S. where men start working when they are still in school, and leave
the parental home earlier than in Italy. Family transition is characterized by a more
modern behavior in the U.S., where men cohabit more and experience periods of single
fatherhood in some cases.
Among women (Figure 3.3) the differences between the two countries are even
more visible. There is one difference that we observed also for men, i.e. that young
women start working when they are still in school in the U.S., while in Italy there is a
fraction of them who are not in school, live with parents and do not work. Also when
they exit from school and find a job the moving-out process is less common and slower.
In addition, more than 20% of Italian women finish school, leave their parents but do not
enter the labor market. So presumably they end up as housewives and possibly mothers.
This group cannot be found in the U.S. where most of women enter the labor market,
many of them also when still in school. Country differences concerning the family
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transitions are very similar to those found among men. In the U.S. more women cohabit
and have children during the cohabitation, and more experience periods of single
motherhood. With respect to men, there are fewer women who are single and leave their
parents, and on average they experience a faster transition.

Figure 3.2. Distribution of Independence and Family Transitions, by Country. Men

!
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of Independence and Family Transitions, by Country.
Women

4.5.2 Cluster analysis
!
Certainly there are large individual variations within countries, and we do want to
identify these differences. Therefore, as a second step and as explained above, we
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perform a cluster analysis pooling data for both countries together, but separately by
gender, in order to identify typologies of different behaviors in the transition to
adulthood. In Figure 3.4 and 3.5 we show the graphs concerning the clusters, respectively
for men and women. In each figure we show on the left the clusters for family formation
and on the right side the clusters for the independence transition.
We start from the discussion of males’ clusters. The first cluster – Modern and
Independent Transition (22.5% of the male sample in Italy and 26.7% in the U.S.) – can
be defined as experiencing a modern behavior in the transition to adulthood. In fact men
in this group leave their parents’ house when they finish school and find a job, but they
do not move out necessarily to marry. They also stay single or cohabit. Moreover men in
cluster 1 delay substantially childbearing. The second cluster instead can be defined as
traditional – Traditional and Early Transition (22.4% of the male sample in Italy and
27.8% in the U.S.) –, given that both their achievement of independence and their family
formation occur very early and pretty quickly. These young men leave their parents very
soon, and usually do it to marry. Very few leave to stay single or to cohabit, and those
who marry become fathers very shortly after the marriage. The third cluster – Slow and
Late Independence (15.1% of the male sample in Italy and 7.5% in the U.S.) – is very
different from the first two. The transition to adulthood is very slow and they gain their
independence very late. Most of them in their late 20s is still in school and lives with
parents, even if they found a job. In addition, more than 20% of men in this group never
marries, never cohabits and does have children before 35 years of age. Also cluster 4 –
Late Home Leavers (with a job) (19.3% of the male sample in Italy and 19.8% in the
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U.S.)– is very different from the first two, but for different reasons. These individuals
finish school and find a job relatively early, but then they do not move out from their
parents’ home, resulting in a strong postponement in family formation: almost 60% by
age 35 still live with parents, they do not marry, or if they do they do it very late. Thu,
their transition to adulthood seems to be incomplete. The fifth cluster – Single Living with
High Education (20.8% of the male sample in Italy and 18.2% in the U.S.) – presents
very peculiar characteristics. These young men leave their family very soon, even if they
are in school and sometimes even before than having a job. They leave to stay single at
least for a while, then they marry or cohabit and have kids. Presumably the typical person
belonging to this cluster is a young man who goes to college and starts living by himself
when still in school. They enter the “marriage market” with some delay because they wait
until they complete education, and they finish later than others. Hence in cluster 5 we do
observe a delay in the transition to adulthood, in this case due to high education.
Figure 3.5 reveals some similarities in a couple of clusters, but also profound
differences in the transitions between men and women, supporting our strategy to analyze
this topic separately by gender. The first cluster – Traditional and Early Transition
(38.3% of the female sample in Italy and 38.8% in the U.S.) – corresponds to a traditional
transition, with an early achievement of independence and a fast family formation
through marriage and motherhood (almost no cohabitation or single living). Cluster 2 –
Modern and Independent Transition (11.4% of the female sample in Italy and 20.2% in
the U.S.) – is extremely modern with respect to cluster 1. In fact these women experience
a very fast transition to independence, and more than 50% at age 24 have already left the
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parental home, have completed education and found a job. When they leave their parents
they do it to stay single or to cohabit. If they marry, they still delay substantially
childbearing or do not have kids at all. The third cluster – Housewives (21.8% of the
female sample in Italy and 3.9% in the U.S.) – is a unique typology that we do not find
among men. These women exit education and leave their parents early in their life, but
they never enter the job market. So they leave their parents because they find a partner,
they marry and have children early. We can define this typology as the one of mothers
and housewives. As we observed in the tables and figures reported above about quantum
and sequencing, most of the women in this cluster are from the Italian sample, because
the majority of American women actually enter the labor market. Cluster 4 – Late Home
Leavers (with a job) (24.8% of the female sample in Italy and 20.9% in the U.S.) – is
very similar to Cluster 4 for men, in which people leave the parental home very late, and
a long time after the end of education and the entry into the labor market. Consequently
they marry late – if they marry – and become mothers even later. In Cluster 5 – Higher
Education (3.6% of the female sample in Italy and 17.3% in the U.S.) – we can find more
educated women that stay in school longer, but find a job while studying and usually
leave their parents early in life. Not necessarily they delay marriage, but to some extent
delay motherhood. Also, in this cluster as in cluster 2 we find a greater number of women
cohabiting than in other typologies.
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Figure 3.4. Clusters derived from the Cluster Analysis – Men!

Note: For a more detailed version of the legend see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 above.
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Figure 3.5. Clusters derived from the Cluster Analysis – Women

Note: For a more detailed version of the legend see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 above.
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4.5.3 Multivariate Analysis
!
Now that we described the different typologies of life course trajectories for men and
women, it is important to go back to the main research question of this study, that is how
the family background and parental socioeconomic status influence the transition to
adulthood, and how this effect differs in the two countries. To answer this question we
implement some multinomial logistic regressions, separately by gender, to test the
importance of parental SES in the probability of belonging to the different clusters in
Italy and in the U.S. Our typology of reference is the one with a traditional life course
trajectory, i.e. Cluster 2 for men and Cluster 1 for women. As explanatory variables in the
model we include birth cohort, the number of siblings in the family of origin, and the key
variables country and parental SES. We do not want to study only the different
probabilities of belonging to a specific typology based on family social class and country,
but we also want to investigate how the role of social class varies in different contexts.
Therefore we include an interaction term between parental SES and the country
dummies. Tables 3.A3 (Men) and 3.A4 (Women) in the Appendix show in details the
results of the multinomial logistic regressions, but to focus on the key results of the
models we plotted in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 the predicted probabilities of being in each
cluster derived from the regressions, by country and family social class. The graphs in
these figures report also the confidence interval (at 95% level) in order to determine if
differences across countries and social classes are significant.
Among men (Figure 3.6) we find that the probability of belonging to the first cluster –
Modern and independent trajectory – is the same in the two countries for a low level of
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parental SES, but it increases by almost 10% in the U.S. as we go from low to high social
class, while it stays the same in Italy. The probability to be in the second cluster –
traditional and early transition – decreases as social class increases in both countries,
even if the probability is always higher in the U.S. The opposite is true when we look at
cluster 3 – slow and late independence – given that the probabilities are quite low in both
countries when parental SES is low (8% in the U.S. and 12% in Italy), they increase
substantially in Italy and get to 25% when social class is high, while they remain very
low in the U.S.
Based on these first three clusters we can say that generally as family socioeconomic
status increases the typologies of life course trajectories in the two countries move in
different directions: in Italy among higher classes emerges a delay both in the
independence and family formation patterns (the effect of parental background is
negative in cluster 2 and positive in cluster 3); in the US an higher status pushes towards
modern and more heterogeneous trajectories in the family formation but it is not clearly
associated with a delay in the independence trajectory (the effect of parental background
is positive in cluster 1 and negative in cluster 2 where both of these clusters are
characterized by early independence).
These indications are confirmed looking at the last two clusters: in the US, men with an
higher social status show a lower probability of belonging to cluster 4 – late home leavers
– , in which exit from parental home and consequently family formation are strongly
postponed, but an higher probability of belonging to cluster 5 – single living with high
education –, in which an early departure from parental home results in an higher
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proportion of men living as a single. In Italy, for both clusters, differences according to
parental background are not supported by an adequate statistical significance.
Among women (Figure 3.7) the probability of experiencing a traditional and early
transition decreases as social class increases in both Italy and the U.S., with a slightly
larger decrease in Italy (from 37% to 32% in the U.S. and from 40% to 27% in Italy, even
if differences between countries are not significant). On the contrary, as parental SES
goes up the probability of being in cluster 2 – modern and independent trajectory –
increases in both countries. In Italy women coming from a low social class have a 8%
probability of being in this cluster, while those from high social class a 23% probability.
In the U.S. the increase goes from 17% to 25%. Predicted probabilities of belonging to
cluster 3 – housewives – clearly shows how the missed entrance into the labor market is a
phenomenon that occurs almost only in the Italian context. The probability is lower than
10% in the U.S. and this probability goes to zero when we look at high parental SES. In
Italy, those with a low family social class have almost 30% probability of being in this
group, and this probability drops to 12% for women from a higher social class. Generally
speaking, the analysis of the first three clusters suggests that among women high social
classes push towards a modern and more heterogeneous pattern of transition to adulthood
in both countries, even though with a different level of the predicted probabilities. On the
contrary, a clear-cut interaction between country and family background emerges for
cluster 4 – late home leavers. In fact, if in Italy the predicted probability is 21% for a low
social class woman, this probability increases to 30% when social class goes up.
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Figure 3.6. Predicted Probability of Being in each Cluster, by Country and Parental
Social Class. Men.
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Figure 3.7. Predicted Probability of Being in each Cluster, by Country and Parental
Social Class. Women.
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In the U.S. instead, the relationship goes in the opposite direction since the probability
decreases from 27% to 15% as family SES goes up. This is clear also if we look at the
predicted probability of ending up in cluster 5 – higher education. First of all this kind of
life course trajectory (i.e. exit from the parental home and find a job when still in school,
presumably in college) is by far more likely to happen in the U.S. Moreover this
probability increases with social class in the U.S. (from 12% to 28%) while it stays
roughly constant in Italy (between 4 and 5%).

Summarizing, among women we have a clear and unambiguous effect of parents’ status
in the US: high social status increases modern trajectories in family formation such as
cohabitation and single living (positive effect in cluster 2 and 5), decreases early
transition due to marriage (negative effect in cluster 1), decreases traditional gender roles
within the couple (negative effect in cluster 3), and also decreases a postponed exit from
parental home (negative effect in cluster 4). Among Italian women, the role of parental
status is more complex and it emerges a sort of dual effect. On the one hand family status
increases the propensity to experience modern and more heterogeneous trajectories
(positive effect in cluster 2) reducing, at the same time, the probability to experience an
early family formation (negative effect in cluster 1) and of being a not-working married
women (negative effect in cluster 3). On the other hand, among those woman who did not
experienced an early departure from parental home, mainly to form new union, coming
from an advantaged family background “protects” Italian women and keep them into the
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family nest for a longer time even if they found a job and completed education (positive
effect in cluster 4).

4.6 Discussion
!
In our analysis we evaluated the role played by parental background in the transition to
adulthood. The inherent complexity of the phenomenon under analysis – transition to
adulthood consists of several events that mutually influence each other – has been
captured by looking at the entire adulthood trajectory, i.e. considering at the same time
the timing, the quantum, and the sequence of events. This allows us to evaluate the effect
of social origins on the entire pattern leading to independence and family formation. This
broader, if not properly “holistic”, perspective has been possible applying a sequence
analysis, followed by a cluster analysis and multinomial logistic regressions. Moreover,
we considered a double comparative perspective taking into account differences by
gender and two different countries, U.S. and Italy,

In general, we found large differences between countries that not always are accounted
for differences in family social class. Descriptive findings show a more relevant
postponement in the transition to adulthood in Italy and a higher heterogeneity of states
and trajectories in the U.S. In particular, compared to U.S., Italy is characterized by a
lower incidence of women entered in the labor market and a reduced occurrence of
informal cohabitation. However, the relevance of social class cannot be neglected. In line
with the existing literature, our results confirm that parental background influences the
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transition to adulthood (Rijken and Liefbroer 2009; Blaauboer and Mulder 2010; Wiik
2008). In general, our analysis shows that the transition to adulthood is slower among
higher classes. However, the more interesting results emerge looking at the interplay
between social class, gender and country. For example, cohabitation is more widespread
among higher classes in Italy, whereas in the U.S. social class is not relevant. On the
contrary marriage is more common among lower classes in Italy whereas in the U.S. it is
more widespread among higher classes.
Multivariate regressions estimates, based on cluster analysis, generally confirm
the main findings showed in the descriptive analysis but add precious indications. The
main result of the analysis is that the effect of parental background is different across
countries and genders. In the U.S., we find that the role of social class is strong but
similar for both genders: high status favors not only a higher education and an early entry
in the labor market, but also an higher heterogeneity of states and the occurrence of new
behaviors like single living and cohabitation. In Italy, the effect of social class is strongly
gender-specific. Among men a higher social class tends to delay transitions (both in terms
of independence and family formation patterns), more than leading towards modern
behaviors in their living arrangement. Among women, we found two different effects.
The first is the same observed in the U.S.: a higher social class tends to facilitate the
experience of more modern and independent transition and to reduce the propensity to
follow more standardized pattern, i.e. exit form parental home to marry and then
parenthood. The second effect relates to the higher probability of postponing the exit
from parental home, and then family formation, among higher class women that
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completed education and found a job. Following a different point of view, results form
multivariate analysis suggest that parents with lower resources put more pressure on their
daughters to leave the parental home and start a family life irrespective of the fact that
they have a job or not. The same result does not apply to men for whom, on the contrary,
difficulties to find a job cause an automatic postponement of family formation.
Going back to the hypotheses made in Section 4.2, our analysis confirms that the
lower the socio-economic status, the higher the probability of experiencing an early and
fast transition to adulthood (H1). This result can be explained by two mechanism: on the
one hand individuals with lower family resources have more constrains that lead to lower
educational attainments and a more rapid entry into the labor market (Furstenberg 2008),
on the other hand that children of lower classes are more prone to experience standard
trajectories (Kohn, Slomczynski and Schoenbach 1986) with the result that the early exit
from parental home corresponds to an early family formation. Our results also confirmed
that the trajectories leading to independence and family formation are more rapid, more
innovative and less standardized in the U.S. than in Italy (H2). This expected result is
totally in line with the different stage of the two countries in the second demographic
transition.
As far as H3 is concerned, the relationship between family background and life
course trajectories is context specific but not in the expected direction. Actually, in the
U.S. de-standardized and individualized trajectories, involving a job before the end of
education, an independent period prior to family formation, informal cohabitation, and
out-of-wedlock pregnancies, are more widespread among individuals with a higher

125
!

!
!
parental status. This contrasts with existing literature focusing on single events or without
a global view on the transition to adulthood. In Italy, the relation is not as clear as in the
U.S. In the South-European country the reliance on the family as a fundamental support
during the first stages in the life course implies that among the higher classes the destandardization of trajectories is less evident. This is expressed mainly in terms of a
further postponement of family formation, due to a prolonged stay in the parental home,
especially among men. Therefore, in Italy, a more affluent family of origin constitutes not
only a protection factor in the presence of economic constraints, such as unemployment
or unaffordable housing market, but also a golden cage (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna
1994) that children are not encouraged to leave even if they have already completed
education and started a job. This result leads us to the conclusion that in Italy the
familistic viewpoint (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004), characterized by strong affective
bonds between parents and children (Micheli 2000; Reher 1998) that are able to hinder
the process leading to residential autonomy, expressed its full potential among wealthier
families.
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4.7 Appendix
!
Figure 3.A1. Survival curves for each event, by gender and family status, Italy
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Figure 3.A2. Survival curves for each event, by gender and family status, U.S.
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Table 3.A1. Multinomial Logistic Regression. Men, N=6,937
Base Outcome: Cluster 2
= Traditional and Early
Transition
Birth Cohort (Ref: 1957)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Number of Siblings

Cl1: Modern
Transition

Cl3: Slow and
Late
Independence

Cl4: Late
Home
Leavers
(with a job)

Cl5: Single
living with
high
Education

1.334*
[0.193]
1.486**
[0.212]
1.770***
[0.242]
2.189***
[0.308]
2.174***
[0.302]
2.662***
[0.375]
3.345***
[0.490]
0.930***
[0.015]

1.094
[0.218]
1.445
[0.273]
1.321
[0.249]
2.019***
[0.375]
1.791**
[0.335]
2.847***
[0.514]
3.573***
[0.658]
0.926**
[0.022]

1.203
[0.184]
1.420*
[0.213]
1.677***
[0.240]
1.961***
[0.290]
2.050***
[0.299]
2.154***
[0.323]
2.961***
[0.454]
0.975
[0.016]

1.219
[0.175]
1.097
[0.161]
1.169
[0.166]
1.450*
[0.211]
1.523**
[0.218]
1.556**
[0.230]
2.236***
[0.337]
0.978
[0.017]

1.205
[0.157]

1.795***
[0.318]

0.944
[0.121]

2.001***
[0.293]

1.241
[0.148]
1.912***
[0.264]

0.764
[0.134]
1.658**
[0.319]

0.811
[0.094]
0.720*
[0.107]

1.233
[0.171]
3.153***
[0.480]

0.844
[0.156]
0.775
[0.194]
0.503***
[0.083]

1.728*
[0.406]
2.115**
[0.592]
0.206***
[0.047]

1.342
[0.251]
1.866*
[0.497]
0.547***
[0.091]

0.829
[0.167]
0.678
[0.171]
0.336***
[0.060]

Country (Ref: U.S.)
Italy
Parental SES (Ref: Low)
Medium
High
Country*Parental SES
(Ref: U.S., Low SES)
Italy, Medium SES
Italy, High SES
Constant

***: p-value <=0.01; **: 0.01<p-value<=0.05; *: 0.05<p-value<=0.1
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Table 3.A2. Multinomial Logistic Regression. Women, N=7,241
Base Outcome: Cluster 1
= Traditional and Early
Transition
Birth Cohort (Ref: 1957)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Number fo Siblings

Cl2: Modern
Transition

Cl3: Housewives

Cl4: Late
Home
Leavers
(with a job)

Cl5: Higher
Education

1.025
[0.150]
1.08
[0.156]
1.142
[0.161]
1.193
[0.169]
1.398*
[0.196]
1.589**
[0.228]
2.092***
[0.310]
0.993
[0.016]

1.163
[0.189]
1.278
[0.204]
1.069
[0.173]
0.988
[0.165]
1.033
[0.173]
1.237
[0.208]
1.691**
[0.286]
1.127***
[0.024]

1.444**
[0.202]
1.482**
[0.205]
1.616***
[0.218]
1.813***
[0.244]
2.156***
[0.287]
2.501***
[0.339]
3.192***
[0.447]
0.984
[0.015]

0.861
[0.162]
0.83
[0.157]
1.045
[0.186]
1.681**
[0.279]
1.947***
[0.322]
2.595***
[0.429]
2.883***
[0.502]
0.949**
[0.018]

0.464***
[0.066]

4.553***
[0.783]

0.734**
[0.086]

0.228***
[0.042]

1.073
[0.129]
1.865***
[0.253]

0.556**
[0.101]
0.174***
[0.064]

0.768*
[0.082]
0.663**
[0.090]

1.088
[0.150]
2.762***
[0.410]

1.698**
[0.329]
2.320***
[0.502]
0.355***
[0.060]

1.525
[0.338]
3.913**
[1.638]
0.088***
[0.020]

1.948***
[0.307]
3.503***
[0.701]
0.414***
[0.065]

0.935
[0.284]
1.053
[0.319]
0.259***
[0.051]

Country (Ref: U.S.)
Italy
Parental SES (Ref: Low)
Medium
High
Country*Parental SES
(Ref: U.S., Low SES)
Italy, Medium SES
Italy, High SES
Constant

***: p-value <=0.01; **: 0.01<p-value<=0.05; *: 0.05<p-value<=0.1
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Latent Class Analysis
Table 3.A3. Latent Class Analysis Output
Men
Model1
Model2
Model3
Model4
Model5
Model6
Model7
Model8

# Clusters
1-Cluster
2-Cluster
3-Cluster
4-Cluster
5-Cluster
6-Cluster
7-Cluster
8-Cluster

LL
-464653
-407929
-367045
-347087
-333095
-322004
-312994
-304696

BIC(LL)
930922.5836
819098.7083
738957.4058
700666.3207
674306.4928
653750.9724
637355.1083
622384.0659

Npar
182
365
548
731
914
1097
1280
1463

L²
804022
690573
608806
568890
540905
518724
500703
484107

df
7009
6826
6643
6460
6277
6094
5911
5728

p-value
3.6e-165856
2.1e-141635
8.9e-124246
2.9e-115853
1.2e-110023
2.9e-105440
1.3e-101749
9.4e-98365

Women
Model1
Model2
Model3
Model4
Model5
Model6
Model7
Model8
Model9
Model10
Model11
Model12
Model13
Model14
Model15
Model16

# Clusters
1-Cluster
1-Cluster
2-Cluster
3-Cluster
4-Cluster
5-Cluster
6-Cluster
7-Cluster
8-Cluster
9-Cluster
10-Cluster
11-Cluster
12-Cluster
13-Cluster
14-Cluster
15-Cluster

LL
-518681
-518681
-458323
-412661
-388315
-369394
-355290
-345821
-336963
-329826
-322724
-316531
-310315
-305581
-301436
-296493

BIC(LL)
1038994
1038994
919918
830234
783182
746981
720413
703116
687041
674408
661843
651098
640306
632478
625830
617584

Npar
183
183
367
551
735
919
1103
1287
1471
1655
1839
2023
2207
2391
2575
2759

L²
907477
907477
786761
695437
646744
608902
580694
561756
544041
529767
515562
503176
490744
481276
472987
463101

df
7264
7264
7080
6896
6712
6528
6344
6160
5976
5792
5608
5424
5240
5056
4872
4688

p-value
1.1e-187868
1.1e-187868
3.0e-162068
6.0e-142611
4.6e-132328
2.3e-124379
3.5e-118501
3.0e-114614
6.1e-110990
9.7e-108105
2.9e-105234
1.1e-102754
3.2e-100265
9.8e-98413
4.3e-96814
2.3e-94872
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Figure 3.A3. Clusters derived from the Latent Class Analysis (5 Clusters) - Men
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Figure 3.A4. Clusters derived from the Latent Class Analysis (5 Clusters) - Women
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5. Conclusions
5.1 Introduction
The transition to adulthood is one of the demographic processes that have changed the
most in the last fifty years in developed societies. All the events considered as markers of
the transition – leaving home, finishing education, securing a job, marrying or cohabiting,
and having children – have been postponed and the their sequence has become less
standardized. This study aimed at gaining more insights in the changes in life course
trajectories by examining the transformations over time in the transition to economic
independence of young adults (Chapters 1 and 2), and the role of family background
(Chapter 3). Several aspects of this demographic process that were not considered
extensively in the literature were incorporated, such as the achievement of financial selfsufficiency of young individuals with labor earnings, and the relationship between
parental social class and life course trajectories.
The research on how people attain independence from the family of origin based
on their economic and employment conditions has been extended. This aspect has been
investigated in different developed countries to consider the possible influence of
different contexts, and its changes over time have been studied. Furthermore, I examined
the effect of parental socioeconomic status on the possibility to experience a more
traditional or a more modern transition to adulthood, taking into account the
interdependence among events through a sequence analysis approach.
Analyses were carried out using survey data from the Luxemburg Income Study
(LIS), the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS, NLSY79, NLSY97), and the
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Multipurpose ISTAT (Family and Social Subjects 2003).
In section 5.2 the main contributions to the literature of the thesis are highlighted.
In section 5.3 major findings will be recapitulated and the research questions will be
answered. Section 5.4 discusses the main conclusions. Finally section 5.5 concludes with
some limitations of the present study and suggestions and directions for future research.

5.2 Contribution to the Literature

!
On the whole, an important merit of this dissertation is that it investigates in details
aspects of the transition to adulthood that were not discussed before in the literature.
More specifically, this study contributes to the literature by testing new
hypotheses. First, it considers one step in the transition to adulthood that has been
investigated in very few studies (and without a systematic approach), that is the
achievement of independence from the family of origin through financial self-sufficiency.
When considering the first steps of young people towards adulthood the events that are
taken into account are the completion of education, the entrance into the labor market and
leaving the parental home. A comparative and comprehensive analysis of earnings
conditions of young adults was missing, and in particular a study of the changes occurred
in the last fifty years. The main sources of inspiration and motivation have been two
articles in the sociological literature. In one work Smeeding and Phillips (2002) analyzed
the economic sufficiency of young people’s earnings in the 1990s in seven countries
(France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Netherlands) using the Luxemburg Income Study (Smeeding and Phillips 2002). In
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another work Bell et al. (2007), on the other end, compare trends in six countries (United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Italy, and Germany) in the household living
arrangements, employment rates, and earnings levels as young adults rise in age from 18
to 34 years old, in the mid-1980s and late 1990s (Bell et al. 2007). However, the
postponement process is strengthening over time so it is necessary to investigate changes
occurred in the first decade of twenty first century and compare the current picture with
the situation in the past. The cross-country comparative analysis in Chapter 1 updates to
some extent the work by Bell et al. (2007) using more recent data of 2004. Chapter 2
gives a detailed description of the economic and employment conditions of young adults
from 1973 until 2007.
Furthermore, both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 devote particular attention to gender
differences and to the possibility of convergence over time in life course trajectories. A
lot has been said on the increase in female labor force participation rate, and expansion of
education especially among women. Nonetheless, these studies have not investigated how
the greater entrance of women into the labor market and increasing returns to education
impact the level of earnings, and the fact that men and women are experiencing more
similar steps in the first part of the transition to adulthood. Also, this convergence in life
course trajectories has important implications for family formation.
The study on the role of family background on the transition to adulthood
(Chapter 3) expands on the demographic and sociological literature that has focused on
the effect of parental social class on timing or sequencing of events. Some studies
analyzed the effect of parental resources on leaving the parental home (De Jong-
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Gierveld, Liefbroer and Beekink 1991), others considered the relationship between social
status and the decision to postpone the first union or childbirth (Rijken and Liefbroer
2009; Wiik 2009). Others studied the importance of high education and employment to
commit to marriage and parenthood, and suggested that their role varies across social
classes (Rajulton and Burch 2010; Rajulton, Ravanera and Beaujot 2007; Ravanera,
Rajulton and Burch 2003; Ravanera, Rajulton and Burch 2006). Generally speaking,
current literature, for the most part, focuses on single events in a single context. Chapter 3
of this dissertation applies a cross-national comparative perspective to evaluate the role of
a specific context in the relationship between parental social class and the transition to
adulthood. In fact, the effect of familial status on the propensity to experience more
complex or innovative pattern of transition to adulthood may be context-specific. The
classification and the characteristics of the different welfare states suggest that the destandardization, turbulence and individualization in life course trajectories are more
advanced in countries that can be classified as liberal or social-democratic compared to
the southern European countries, where welfare support is very weak and we observe a
reliance on the family as the locus of support (Ferrera 1996; Mayer 2001; Trifiletti 1999).
In our analysis we compare North America and Southern Europe given the crucial
differences suggested by the existing literature.
In addition the analysis takes into account the interdependence among all the
events in the transition to adulthood. The life course paradigm assumes that individuals,
as human agents, build their future on the basis of the constraints and opportunities
experienced in the past (Elder 1994). The process is iterative and cumulative, since initial
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advantages or disadvantages often are amplified with time (Giele and Elder 1998). Life
courses are embedded in different time and location and are affected by the social context
in which individuals live. In addition, different life domains are strongly interdependent.
Rather than investigating the contemporaneous association between parental social class
and a single event, life course analysis looks at the whole life trajectory. Under this
perspective, characteristics such as type, number, duration and order of events may have
been influenced by family background. Only a limited number of studies adopt a
complete life course perspective. The implementation of sequence analysis allows to
capture complexity, sequencing, and timing of life course trajectories, and study how
they differ according to parental social class.

5.3 Summary of Findings

!
As mentioned in the previous section, the literature on the transition to adulthood has not
yet achieved a consensus about why there has been a postponement of events and a destandardization of life course trajectories. This dissertation aimed at investigate in further
details how the transition is different now than five decades ago, and at shed some light
on the possible reasons about these transformations. Hence the first research question
addressed in this work analyzes trends over time in some salient events of the transition
to adulthood:
1) How has the transition to adulthood changed in the last decades, in particular
the first steps, i.e. entry into the labor market and the achievement of economic
independence? Are these changes different across developed countries?
This research question has been answered in Section 2 (Chapter 1). I used the Luxemburg
138
!

!
!
Income Study to perform a cross-national comparison of six countries: the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands. In particular I
compared young adults between ages 22 and 30 from these countries in two points in
time – the mid 1980s and 2004 – to detect common and divergent trends.
To investigate how the transition to adulthood has changed in the Western
developed world I started from two fundamental steps in the process, entry into the labor
market with a full-time job and attainment of satisfactory level of wages. The picture that
is presented is not particularly reassuring. There is a general decreasing trend in the
percentage working more than 35 hours per week and 40 weeks per year, and earning
enough to be in good financial conditions. This happens mainly among men, and in some
countries we observe a convergence when age increases (e.g. in UK, U.S. and
Netherlands), but in some other countries the delay has not been recuperated by age 30.
The situation is more positive for women, who are more active in the labor force in 2004
than in the mid-1980s. There are still places where the proportions are well below those
of the 1980s, for example in Germany and Italy, but the general trend is positive. This has
also a positive influence on their level of wages, given that in all countries, but Italy, by
age 30 the proportion of females who achieved economic independence is higher in 2004
than in the 1980s. These two parallel but divergent processes occurring among men and
among women start to close the gap and reduce the distance prevailing in the mid-1980s
between sexes. Moreover, the postponement has been less drastic among those with high
education.
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Despite some general similarities across countries, substantial differences still remain and
do not seem to reconcile over time. The delays in the transition towards economic selfsufficiency are limited in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in the
Netherlands. Norway is in an intermediate position with a delay that is more pronounced
among men, and high variability across ages. Germany, and in particular Italy are the two
countries with the most visible postponement and the lowest proportions of young adults
who attained satisfactory levels of earnings. Hence, it is evident how contexts matter, and
the results are to some extent linked to the structure of the labor market and welfare state
systems.
Also Chapter 2 of this dissertation answers this first research question, analyzing
in more details the United States situation and going back in time to 1970s. This chapter
compared the life course of young adults between 22 and 30 years old in 1973, 1987, and
2007, using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys in 1966 (NLS Original
Cohorts), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 1979 (NLSY79) and 1997
(NLSY97). The main result, confirming findings of Chapter 1, is that it is more difficult
for young adults to achieve economic independence in 2007 than it was 35 years before.
A sizable difference exists between 1973, 1987 and 2007 in the percentages of young
people able to live independently or to support a family of three people with their own
earnings.

In both Chapter 1 and 2 I find to some extent a different picture for men and women, and
this brings us to the second research question addressed here:
2) How do the trends differ between young men and women? Has there been
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convergence between men and women in employment and financial independence
over time?
Chapter 1 showed how males and females’ careers – or the way they face the transition to
adulthood – become more similar over time, and even if the gap is very similar in 2004
and 1980s at young ages, it decreases as age increases (with proportions for men that are
still always higher). This is confirmed in Chapter 2. Among young men in the U.S. the
differences grow with age, suggesting that postponement of economic independence is
considerable and that over a six-year time span there is no recuperation. Among women
there is an increase over time in the proportion working full-time, due mainly to a
substantial expansion of education and an increase in the female labor force participation.
Hence there are signs of convergence over time in the situation of men and women
concerning the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.

The third and last research question is introduced in Chapter 2 and analyzed more
carefully in Chapter 3:
3) How do changes in the transition to adulthood differ by social class and family
background? Is the role of parents’ socioeconomic status changing over time and
context specific?
In Chapter 2, when the survival analysis looks at the role of family background, it is
found that having parents with high education slightly increases the probability of
achieving independence. This means that growing up in an “advantaged” family may
have some beneficial effects in terms of economic independence during the transition to
adulthood. However the positive role of parents’ socio-economic status seems to change
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over time, being strong and evident in 1987 but not in 1973 and in 2007. Also, the
association between parental socioeconomic status and the “risk” of becoming selfsufficient is different between men and women. The beneficial effect that we may
observe is stronger for women, suggesting that being from an advantaged family makes it
easier to achieve economic independence for a woman than for a man – who is probably
better off in terms of employment and earnings independently on the conditions of the
family of origin.
This finding shows how the role of parental social class and family background is
extremely important in the process of the transition to adulthood. Hence in Chapter 3,
using the NLSY79 and the ISTAT Multipurpose Survey, the aim was to compare the role
of parental status in shaping life courses of young adults in the United States and in Italy
using a sequence analysis approach. In general, large differences between countries that
not always are accounted for differences in family social class persist. Descriptive
findings show a more relevant postponement in the transition to adulthood in Italy and a
higher heterogeneity of states and trajectories in the U.S. independent of social class. In
particular, compared to U.S., Italy is characterized by a lower incidence of women
entered in the labour market and a reduced occurrence of informal cohabitation.
However, the relevance of social class cannot be neglected. The analysis showed that the
effect of parental background is different across countries and genders. In the U.S., the
role of social class is strong but similar for both genders: high status favors not only a
higher education and an early entry in the labor market, but also an higher heterogeneity
of states and the occurrence of new behaviors like single living and cohabitation. In Italy,
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the effect of social class is strongly gender-specific. Among men a higher social class
tends to delay transitions (both in terms of independence and family formation patterns),
more than leading towards modern behaviors in their living arrangement. Among women,
two different effects are in place. The first is the same observed in the U.S.: a higher
social class tends to facilitate the experience of more modern and independent transition
and to reduce the propensity to follow more standardized pattern, i.e. exit form parental
home to marry and then parenthood. The second effect relates to the higher probability of
postponing the exit from parental home, and then family formation, among higher class
women that completed education and found a job. Following a different point of view,
results form multivariate analysis suggest that parents with lower resources put more
pressure on their daughters to leave the parental home and start a family life irrespective
of the fact that they have a job or not. The same result does not apply to men for whom,
on the contrary, difficulties to find a job cause an automatic postponement of family
formation.

5.4 Main Conclusions

!
A first main conclusion of this study is that also the transition to economic independence
has been delayed together with all the other events of the transition to adulthood. This
process has occurred in all developed Western countries even if with some differences.
Financial independence is a complex concept, and it is hard to define exactly when and
how young adults achieve it. For this reason we used several measures of economic selfsufficiency based on earnings, but results do not change substantially. The main common
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trend taking place in all developed societies is a deterioration in economic and
employment conditions among men, and an improvement in women’s participation to the
labor market with some positive influences on their attainment of financial selfsufficiency. This phenomenon, that started in the second half of twentieth century as part
of the second demographic transition, is bringing to a convergence in life course
trajectories across gender that may have important implications for the subsequent steps
like family formation.
A second conclusion that can be drawn concerning the role of parental social class
and family background is that these factors can explain some of the variation in life
courses of young adults, that are becoming more diverse and de-standardized over time.
It is important, however, to take an “holistc” approach and look at the entire adulthood
trajectory, i.e. considering at the same time the timing, the quantum, and the sequence of
events, given the inherent complexity of the phenomenon under analysis. Also, the
impact of social class is different in different context. Given the nature of resources that
are transferred from the family of origin to individuals (that may be economic and
cultural), the role of social class differentiates based on welfare state regimes,
institutions, and the strength of family ties. In the United States a higher social status is
associated with a higher heterogeneity of states and the occurrence of new behaviors like
single living and cohabitation. In Italy a more affluent family of origin constitutes not
only a protection factor in the presence of economic constraints, such as unemployment
or unaffordable housing market, but also a golden cage that children are not encouraged
to leave even if they have already completed education and started a job.
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5.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

!
The empirical analyses of this dissertation are not free of limitations. It is important to
reflect on them given that usually being aware of limits makes it possible to suggest
directions for future research.
The main constraint encountered when studying the transition to economic
independence is the definition of economic independence it self. The concept of financial
self-sufficiency can be defined in several ways, such as being able to live in a separate
household, without any family members and without any financial support from the
family of origin. It can also be defined as the ability to establish a partnership and have a
child. In addition, the source of economic independence is also relevant. It can be
earnings from work, welfare and social transfers in addition to wages, family income, or
even loans. Young adults who decide to go to college or graduate studies after that will
achieve financial self-sufficiency at an older age than those who do not go to college.
However, investing in more education can pay off in the long run and can lead to a more
secure job and a higher standard of living. Consequently it is unclear whether economic
independence should be evaluated using current income, if any, or the discounted flow of
future earnings. Furthermore, the meaning of self-sufficiency may have changed from
1970s. Both expectations about what it takes to live independently and the actual costs of
living have changed. Ideally, to answer our research questions, it would be necessary to
define economic independence taking into account all the issues discussed above. The
measure used in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 therefore could be biased, even though some
robustness checks produce similar findings. Hence it is important in future analysis to
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consider these possible biases, and to follow people over time in their transition to
adulthood, to investigate how investments in higher education may delay the achievement
of economic independence but also improve the subsequent standard of living.
In addition, the studies on economic independence show clearly a postponement
over the past four decades, but the potential implications of the delay for family
formation have not been examined directly. Men’s lower proportion working full-time
and their later economic self-sufficiency may have a “negative” impact on the timing of
marriage (or cohabitation) and parenthood, transferring the delay also on these events
(Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Gibson-Davis 2009). The positive
results obtained by women do not necessarily counterbalance the effects of men’s delay
of economic self-sufficiency in family formation (Harknett and Kuperberg 2009;
Sweeney 2002). As a matter of fact, an increase in the proportion of women working fulltime and able to support themselves may not translate into incentives for marriage and
motherhood – as it might happen for men. Better education and career opportunities, with
consequent higher wages, would enable women to forgo marriage. Gains from marriage
and role specialization within marriage dissipate with women’s growing investments in
human capital and careers. The higher their level of education and the better their job
opportunities, the more likely women are to postpone or even avoid marriage and
motherhood (independence effect). An alternative hypothesis, with different implications,
is that women’s earnings contribute to a couple’s higher standard of living, which
encourages marriage (income effect). Which scenario dominates is not clear yet and
appears to be dependent on other factors such as local and country context, birth cohort,
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and educational attainment (Harknett and Kuperberg 2009; Sweeney 2002).
In future research it is necessary first to evaluate how economic conditions
evolved over time and to follow individuals in their late 30s. As a matter of fact it is
important to study whether the postponement of events observed between 20 and 30
years of age has been recuperated later in life or if the delay is transferred also to older
ages. This would be enabled by the new waves of the NLSY79 that will be released in the
next few years. Given the longitudinal nature of the data set, so far individuals (born
between 1980 and 1984) are followed until age 31, but over time it will be possible to
follow them in their late 30s. Secondly, the implications of a later independence
achievement on family formation, mainly cohabitation, marriage, and parenthood can be
investigated.
Finally, the relationship between parental social class and life course trajectories
of young adults has been investigated for cohorts born between 1957 and 1964, to be able
to study their behavior from adolescence to late 30s. However, future research should
consider the role of family background among younger cohorts and compare the changes
occurred over time. Also in this case, if we consider the comparison between Italy and
the United States, the new waves of the NLSY97 would allow to replicate the analysis for
young people born between 1980 and 1984. Also, it is necessary to extend this study to
other context. In Chapter 3 the comparison between Italy and the United States has
exemplified the contrast between North America and Southern Europe, located at very
different stages of the second demographic transition. Nonetheless it is essential to
consider how institutions, culture, and family ties interact in other countries to
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disentangle the complex mechanisms behind the relationship between social class and
differences in life course trajectories.
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